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U.C.L.A. Law Review    
Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst  
Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, which struck down Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme, altered the Court’s Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.  That doctrine 
has undergone several important changes since it was first recognized.  At times the doctrine has 
expanded, invalidating sentencing practices across the country, and at times it has contracted, 
allowing restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion based on findings that are not submitted 
to a jury.  Hurst represents another expansion of the doctrine.  Although the precise scope of 
the decision is unclear, the most sensible reading of Hurst suggests that any finding required 
before a judge may impose a higher sentence must first be submitted to a jury and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  This reading invalidates several state capital sentencing systems and 
several noncapital systems, and it would require dramatic changes to federal sentencing as well.
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INTRODUCTION 
In its 2016 decision, Hurst v. Florida,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the Florida’s capital sentencing system violated the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.2  Although the opinion purports to routinely apply the Court’s 
previous Sixth Amendment cases, a closer examination of Hurst shows that it 
expanded the doctrine.  The Court struck down Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme because it conditioned the imposition of the death penalty on findings 
made by a judge, even though a jury had already made the same findings.  But 
the Court’s previous Sixth Amendment cases seemingly permitted such judicial 
factfinding when made subsequent to similar jury findings. 
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court has expanded its Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine without explicitly acknowledging that it was 
doing so.  In Ring v. Arizona,3 decided in 2002, the Court invalidated Arizona’s 
capital sentencing scheme.4  Ring claimed to simply apply existing doctrine, and 
because only a handful of states employed similar capital schemes, the case 
initially seemed relatively unimportant.  But the decision in Ring actually 
modified the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine, and that modification 
proved momentous.  Using the slightly modified Ring rule, the Supreme Court 
invalidated both the mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the noncapital sentencing regimes in multiple states within 
three years.5 
History may be repeating itself.  Although the holding in Hurst applied 
only to the Florida death penalty scheme—and very few states have similar 
capital sentencing schemes—the manner in which Hurst broadened the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine may ultimately have wide-ranging effects in 
both capital and noncapital cases. 
In particular, Hurst makes clear that mere “authorization” of a sentence by 
a jury does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment.6  Prior to Hurst, several 
 
1. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
2. Id. at 624. 
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
4. Id. at 609. 
5. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the mandatory 
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment); Blakely 
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that mandatory state sentencing guidelines 
violate the Sixth Amendment). 
6. As explained below, a statute “authorizes” a sentence when the sentence is available under 
the statute.  But mere authorization is not enough where certain facts serve as statutory 
prerequisites to the imposition of the sentence.  See infra Part III. 
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sentencing systems distinguished between factual findings that authorize or 
make a defendant eligible for a sentencing increase, and other findings required 
to impose a sentence.  Several courts have held that only those findings that 
“authorize” a sentence need be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt; a judge could make other findings by using a preponderance 
of the evidence standard.7  Hurst rejects this authorization approach to the 
Sixth Amendment.  Instead, Hurst requires that a jury—as opposed to a 
judge—make all factual findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, necessary for the 
imposition of the sentence. 
In addition, Hurst may have expanded the category of findings that trigger 
the Sixth Amendment.  Prior to Hurst, the Court had intimated that Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine applied only to findings of historical fact.8  
But language in Hurst suggests that juries must also make qualitative 
determinations, such as the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, when those determinations are necessary for the imposition of 
particular sentences.  Like Hurst’s rejection of “authorization,” an expansion of 
the Sixth Amendment to qualitative findings would affect many sentencing 
systems across the country.  A number of states require judges to weigh 
aggravating and mitigating facts or make other qualitative findings before 
increasing punishment.9  Hurst suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires 
juries to perform those tasks instead. 
This Article explores the wide-ranging consequences of Hurst on 
sentencing in the United States.  It identifies the capital and noncapital sentencing 
systems that Hurst appears to invalidate—a list that is quite long.  But this 
Article does more than simply identify the practical consequences of Hurst.  It 
also explains how Hurst’s expansion of the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine improves the doctrine—a doctrine that has been in a state of near-
constant flux since 2000.10  Those fluctuations stem, in part, from the Court’s 
 
7. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc); State v. Gales, 658 
N.W.2d 604, 612–13 (Neb. 2003).  It is worth noting that judicial factfinding typically 
requires a lower standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) than jury factfinding 
(beyond a reasonable doubt). 
8. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (stating that, under the Sixth Amendment, capital defendants “are 
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase 
in their maximum punishment” (emphasis added)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)). 
9. See infra Subpart IV.A (cataloguing these states). 
10. There is a robust literature that addresses the wide-ranging consequences of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey and the subsequent expansions and contractions of the Sixth Amendment.  See, 
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struggle to accommodate various considerations, including history, formalism, 
and the values that underlie the right to a jury trial.  Hurst strikes a balance 
between these competing concerns, and it does so in a manner that is both 
sensible and administrable.  That is because Hurst makes judicial sentencing 
discretion the touchstone of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.  There 
is no jury right for findings that a judge makes of her own accord; the right 
exists only if the finding is required before the imposition of a sentence. 
To be sure, Hurst does not explicitly acknowledge this expansion.  Just as 
Ring purported to simply apply existing doctrine,11 so too the opinion in Hurst 
describes the decision as a straightforward application of Ring to Florida’s 
capital sentencing regime.12  But that cannot be the case.  Ring only required juries 
to make findings that were necessary to increase punishment; it was silent 
about requiring judges to make additional findings, and subsequent cases 
appeared to permit such judicial findings.13  If Hurst merely applied Ring, then 
Florida did not violate Timothy Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights because he 
had a jury finding that authorized the imposition of the death penalty.14  As 
explained below, the only sensible way to read Hurst is as an expansion of the 
Sixth Amendment’s scope from factual findings that authorize sentencing 
increases to all factual findings required to impose a higher sentence. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a brief overview of the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine before Hurst, and it describes how 
Hurst expanded the doctrine.  Part II explains that, after Hurst, a jury must 
make all factual findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, that are required in order 
to impose a higher sentence.  This reading rejects any constitutional distinction 
 
e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: 
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005) 
(exploring whether the Apprendi line of cases is best understood as a blunder); Stephanos 
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 
YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (discussing the likely effect of the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine on defendants who plead guilty); Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the 
Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) (criticizing the Sixth Amendment sentencing cases); Nancy J. 
King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467 (2001); Jonathan S. 
Masur, Booker Reconsidered, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091 (2010) (using a dissent by Judge 
Easterbrook to critique Booker). 
11. See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
12. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016) (“We granted certiorari to resolve whether 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring.  We 
hold that it does, and reverse.” (citation omitted)). 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 115–117. 
14. At least, the death penalty was “authorized” in the sense that the word “authorized” has 
been used by courts applying the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 149–150, 196–197, 202–203. 
Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst 453 
 
between factual findings that “authorize” a sentence and factual findings that 
are required to impose a sentence.  Hurst also suggests that the jury right applies 
not only to findings of historical fact, but also to other required findings, 
including qualitative determinations.  Part II explains how these doctrinal 
expansions are grounded not only in the formalist logic of Hurst, but also in 
larger principles about the role of the jury and about the role of judicial 
discretion that appear both inside and outside of the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine. 
Parts III and IV drill down on these two expansions, explaining how Hurst 
supports each of these rules, identifying those sentencing systems that run afoul 
of each rule, and addressing counterarguments to adopting these rules in the 
wake of Hurst.  Part III addresses the expansion of the Sixth Amendment from 
factual findings that “authorize” a sentence to all factual findings that are 
required to impose a sentence.  Part IV addresses the possibility that Hurst 
expanded the Sixth Amendment from findings of historical fact to all required 
findings, including qualitative determinations. 
I. HURST AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING DOCTRINE 
To understand Hurst and how it has shifted Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine, it is necessary to explore briefly the genesis of the doctrine and its 
evolution.  This Part traces the rise of the doctrine, as well as its various 
expansions and contractions.  Then, it demonstrates why Hurst did more than 
simply apply Ring. 
A. The Rise of the Sixth Amendment Sentencing Doctrine 
In 1999, the Supreme Court first suggested that the Sixth Amendment 
placed restrictions on sentencing practices in Jones v. United States.15  Jones 
involved the proper interpretation of the federal carjacking statute.  The statute 
provided for higher maximum sentences if various aggravating circumstances 
were present, such as inflicting serious bodily injury.16  The Jones Court had to 
decide whether those aggravating circumstances constituted elements for 
separate crimes or whether they were mere sentencing enhancements to be 
 
15. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (“[D]iminishment of the jury’s significance 
by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate 
with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet 
settled.”). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) (2018). 
454 66 UCLA L. REV. 448 (2019) 
 
decided by the judge.17  The Court interpreted the statute as setting forth 
separate crimes, and it relied, in part, on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.18  According to the Jones Court, interpreting the statute as 
establishing sentencing enhancements, rather than separate crimes with 
different elements, “would merit Sixth Amendment concern.”19  Allowing 
states to characterize elements of crimes as sentencing enhancements would let 
legislatures remove from juries the determination of whether a defendant was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a given element.  It would reallocate that 
determination to judges, who need only find that element occurred by a 
preponderance of the evidence.20 
The same issue arose the following year in Apprendi v. New Jersey.21  
Apprendi involved a New Jersey statute that increased the maximum penalty 
for crimes committed “with a purpose to intimidate . . . because of race, color, 
gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”22  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as setting forth a sentencing 
enhancement, rather than as creating a separate crime.23  Because it was a 
sentencing enhancement, the New Jersey court reasoned that the trial court 
need only make the finding of intimidation by a preponderance of the 
evidence.24  This state court interpretation forced the U.S. Supreme Court to 
answer definitively whether the Sixth Amendment prohibited judges from 
making such findings by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Apprendi Court held that the Sixth Amendment jury right did, in fact, 
prohibit judges from making such findings.  Specifically, the Court held that 
any fact that increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime must be 
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.25  The Court based its 
 
17. 526 U.S. at 230–32. 
18. Id. at 239–40. The canon of constitutional avoidance prefers the Court to decide cases on 
nonconstitutional grounds as opposed to constitutional ones when possible.  For a 
discussion of the doctrine and an example of its application, see William W. Berry III, 
Criminal Constitutional Avoidance, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (2014). 
19. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248. 
20. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged); Mullaney 
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975) (applying Winship to Maine’s heat of passion law). 
21. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44–3(e) (West Supp. 1999–2000) (repealed 2001).  
23. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471–73. 
24. Id. at 468–69, 471–73. 
25. Id. at 490.  The Court recognized an exception for prior convictions, which is discussed in 
more detail infra text accompanying note 163. 
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decision on the importance of the jury trial right, which serves as a check on state 
power, as well as on the history of juries and punishment in the United States.26 
Because the Court limited the rule announced in Apprendi to increases in 
statutory maximum sentences, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine did 
not appear to affect many structured sentencing guideline practices in the 
United States.  Structured sentencing arose in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century in response to perceptions that broad statutory sentencing ranges gave 
judges too much power to impose dramatically different sentences on 
defendants who had committed similar crimes.27  In order to combat 
sentencing disparity, a number of states and the federal government adopted 
legislative or administrative schemes that limited judicial sentencing authority 
to narrow bands within statutory ranges, based on a judge’s factual findings at 
sentencing.28  Because the Court framed Apprendi’s rule in terms of increasing 
the maximum statutory sentences, these structured sentencing practices 
appeared constitutional in the wake of Apprendi. 
But Ring v. Arizona29 expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine 
beyond statutory maxima.  Ring involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to 
Arizona’s capital sentencing regime.  Arizona convicted Timothy Ring of first-
degree murder, and the statutory maximum punishment for murder was the 
death penalty.  Arizona law permitted the imposition of the death penalty only 
if certain aggravating circumstances were present, and Arizona assigned the 
task of finding those aggravating circumstances to the trial judge, not a jury.30 
The Ring Court held that this sentencing scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment.  Even though the maximum punishment for first-degree murder 
specified in the statute was death—thus satisfying the rule articulated in 
Apprendi—the Court focused on the maximum penalty that Ring could receive 
based on his conviction alone, which was life imprisonment.31  Unless and until 
 
26. 530 U.S. at 476–90. 
27. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (explaining this shift as part of the shift from penal 
welfarism to penal populism); Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a 
Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 169–73 (2016) (describing the rise of structured 
sentencing). 
28. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal 
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69 (1999); Kevin R. Reitz, 
Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State 
Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997); see also infra notes 103–108 and accompanying 
text. 
29. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
30. See id. at 592–93 (describing the Arizona capital sentencing system). 
31. See id. at 597 (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony 
murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment.”). 
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the judge found an aggravating circumstance, the judge could not sentence 
Ring to death.  And this, according to the Ring Court, violated the Sixth 
Amendment.32  For the sentence to be constitutional, the jury had to find the 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.33 
Notably, the Ring Court framed its holding narrowly: that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”34  
And it explained its holding as nothing more than an application of Apprendi to 
capital cases.35  When the Court decided Ring, only four other states—Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska—had similar capital sentencing schemes.36  
Initially, the Ring decision’s effect seemed to be modest.  But in applying 
Apprendi’s rule to something more than a straightforward increase of a 
statutory maximum penalty, Ring had dramatically expanded the scope of the 
doctrine to other forms of structured sentencing.37 
Two years later, in Blakely v. Washington,38 the Court, citing Ring, 
acknowledged this expansion of the doctrine: “Our precedents make clear, 
however, that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”39  By expanding the Sixth Amendment to 
apply to factual findings that a jury must make before the judge has the 
authority to increase a sentence, Ring invalidated many of the structured 
guideline sentencing systems that were thought to have survived Apprendi.40  
Within a year of deciding Blakely, the Supreme Court used the expanded Sixth 
 
32. See id. at 609. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See, e.g., id. at 589, 609 (framing the decision as a mere acknowledgment that Apprendi was 
“irreconcilable” with a previous decision upholding Arizona’s capital system) (“Capital 
defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury 
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment.”). 
36. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (2001) (providing for a similar scheme, but employing a 
three-judge panel)); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1997); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). 
37. See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 322 (2016) (stating that Ring clarified that 
Apprendi was not “a drafting rule” and, as a result, “Ring would prove to be the intellectual 
forebear of Blakely”). 
38. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
39. Id. at 303 (alteration in original). 
40. PFAFF, supra note 37, at 328 (“[T]he outcome in Blakely was inevitable given the Court’s 
holding in Ring.”). 
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Amendment sentencing doctrine to invalidate mandatory application of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as well.41 
But the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has not expanded in an 
unbroken line.  The doctrine has experienced several contractions.  For 
example, in Harris v. United States,42 the Court refused to apply the doctrine to 
statutes that imposed mandatory minimum sentences.43  In Oregon v. Ice,44 the 
Court held that the U.S. Constitution did not prohibit states from assigning the 
findings of fact necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences for 
multiple offenses to the judge, rather than the jury.45  Most notably, in applying 
the Sixth Amendment doctrine to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court 
has repeatedly permitted some restrictions on federal judges’ ability to increase 
sentences in the absence of factual findings, suggesting that not all factual findings 
required to increase a defendant’s sentence trigger the Sixth Amendment.46 
But the Court has also expanded the doctrine in the years since Ring.  In 
Southern Union v. United States,47 the Court extended the doctrine to criminal 
fines.48  Most notably, in Alleyne v. United States,49 the Court overruled Harris 
and held that the Sixth Amendment applied not only to findings that increased 
the maximum available punishment, but also to findings that imposed 
mandatory minimum punishments.50 
These expansions and contractions illustrate that the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine is still in flux.  Sometimes, the Court explicitly acknowledges 
a contraction or expansion in the case that establishes it.51  But other times, it 
 
41. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the mandatory 
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment). 
42. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
43. Id. at 548. 
44. 555 U.S. 160 (2009). 
45. Id. at 169–70, 172.  Many commenters have argued that the holding in Ice is entirely 
incompatible with the rules announced in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely.  See, e.g., PFAFF, 
supra note 37, at 368–70 (stating that Ice is entirely inconsistent with Ring and Blakely); 
Bowman, supra note 10, at 455–58 (criticizing the analysis in Ice as “little more than a 
compilation of the arguments rejected by the majority opinions in Apprendi, Blakely, and 
Cunningham”). 
46. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 66 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 230–32.  The 
Court’s decisions about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have triggered a near-avalanche 
of critical commentary.  See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate 
Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006). 
47. 567 U.S. 343 (2012). 
48. Id. at 360. 
49. 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
50. See id. at 103. 
51. See, e.g., id. (explicitly overruling Harris). 
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has altered the doctrine without acknowledging the shift until subsequent 
cases.52  As the next Subpart explains, Hurst appears to fall into this second 
category.  Just as the rule announced in Apprendi could not fully explain the 
outcome in Ring, the rule announced in Ring cannot fully explain the outcome 
in Hurst. 
B. Reading Hurst 
Timothy Lee Hurst received a death sentence in Florida for murdering his 
coworker, Cynthia Harrison.53  Authorities found Harrison’s body in the 
freezer of the restaurant where she worked—bound, gagged, and stabbed over 
sixty times.54  The jury found Hurst guilty and recommended a death 
sentence.55  Under Florida law, the trial judge was required to hold a separate 
hearing to determine whether “sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to 
justify imposing the death penalty.”56  The trial judge reached the same 
conclusion as the jury and sentenced Hurst to death.57 
Hurst challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that Florida’s sentencing 
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment.  Specifically, he asserted that his 
sentence ran afoul of Ring v. Arizona,58 because a jury, not a judge, must find 
the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.  The Florida Supreme 
Court affirmed his sentence, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
previously upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing system.59  
In particular, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Hildwin v. Florida,60 in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment “does not 
require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of 
 
52. This happened not only in Ring, see supra text accompanying notes 34–37, but also in 
Booker, which did not acknowledge all of the restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion 
that the new advisory system imposed until later cases.  See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 49–50, 50 n.6 (2007). 




57. See id.  Because of an error, the Florida Supreme Court initially reversed the sentence.  At 
resentencing, the jury again issued its advisory verdict of death, and the judge again found 
the facts necessary to sentence Hurst to death.  See id. at 620. 
58. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
59. See Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435, 445–47, 449 (Fla. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); see 
also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1989), overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(upholding Florida’s capital statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1976) 
(same). 
60. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616. 
Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst 459 
 
death be made by the jury.”61  The Florida court noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court never overruled Hildwin in its post–Apprendi cases.62 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  It held that Hurst’s sentence violated the 
Sixth Amendment, and it overruled Hildwin and other prior cases “to the extent 
they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent 
of a jury’s factfinding, that is necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”63 
At first glance, Hurst reads as a simple application of Ring.  Indeed, much 
language in the majority opinion supports this reading.64  For example, the 
majority states: 
 
61. Id. at 640–41. 
62. Hurst, 147 So.3d at 446–47.  The Court decided Hildwin more than a decade before its 
embrace of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine in Apprendi. 
63. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.  Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but on the grounds that 
judicial sentencing in a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the Court should revisit 
Ring, and further, should not extend it to Hurst because Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme was distinguishable from the Arizona scheme struck down in Ring.  Id. at 625–26 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
64. The majority opinion begins by explaining that, although a jury recommended a death 
sentence for Hurst, “Florida law required the judge to hold a separate hearing and 
determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the 
death penalty.”  Id. at 619 (majority opinion).  After this description, the Court 
pronounced: “We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional.  The Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.  A 
jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Id. 
  Notably, every time that the Hurst majority referenced the case’s holding, it always 
framed the holding in terms of the imposition of capital punishment.  See, e.g., id. (“The 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a 
sentence of death.”); id. at 622 (“As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment 
Timothy Hurst could have received without any judge-made findings was life in prison 
without parole.  As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s authorized punishment based on 
her own factfinding.  In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth 
Amendment.”); id. at 624 (“Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of 
Spaziano and Hildwin.  The decisions are overruled to the extent they allow a sentencing 
judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”); id. (“The Sixth Amendment protects a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury.  This right required Florida to base Timothy Hurst’s 
death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.  Florida’s sentencing scheme, 
which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is 
therefore unconstitutional.”). 
  In light of this framing, one might argue that the holding in Hurst applies only to capital 
sentencing proceedings.  But such an argument is almost certainly wrong.  Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that capital defendants are entitled to certain 
rights that are not guaranteed to defendants who are not facing the death penalty, see, e.g., 
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1149–62 (2009) 
(describing heightened Eighth Amendment scrutiny in capital cases), the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right is not one of those rights.  And the Supreme Court has always 
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As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst 
could have received without any judge-made findings was life in 
prison without parole.  As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s 
authorized punishment based on her own factfinding.  In light of 
Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth 
Amendment.65 
But there are features of Florida’s capital sentencing statute that are 
difficult to square with the holding in Ring.  The Florida jury made only a 
recommendation to the sentencing judge, and regardless of what sentence the 
jury recommended, the judge was free to make her own sentencing decision.66  
 
applied the Sixth Amendment sentencing rule that it first articulated in Apprendi—that a 
court cannot increase a punishment for a crime unless the fact that increases the 
punishment is submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt—to capital and 
noncapital defendants alike.  See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (“Capital 
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury 
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment.”).  Also, if the holding in Hurst had been limited to death penalty 
cases, then Justice Breyer presumably would have joined the majority opinion rather than 
concurring in the judgment.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence was based on his view that “the 
Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a 
defendant to death.”  Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
65. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (majority opinion). 
66. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)–(3) (2015).  The relevant text read: 
(1)  SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF PENALTY.—Upon 
conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court 
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the 
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by 
s. 775.082 . . . 
(2)  ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.—After hearing all the evidence, 
the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based 
upon the following matters: 
(a)  Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in 
subsection (5); 
(b)  Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances found to exist; and 
(c)  Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced 
to life imprisonment or death. 
(3)  FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.—
Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, 
after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of 
death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death 
is based as to the facts: 
(a)  That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in 
subsection (5), and 
(b)  That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances.  In each case in which the court imposes the death 
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A judge could impose a death sentence when a jury recommended life in 
prison, and she could impose a life sentence when the jury recommended 
death.67  The jury’s advisory sentence did not determine which sentence the 
judge imposed; rather, it was whether the judge could find that “sufficient 
aggravating circumstances exist[ed],” as enumerated in the relevant statute, 
and that “there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances.”68  The statute classified these findings as “facts.”69 
If Timothy Hurst’s jury had recommended a sentence of life 
imprisonment, there is no question that his death sentence would have violated 
the rule from Ring.  If the finding of one or more facts is necessary to increase a 
sentence, then a jury must find those facts, not a judge.70  But Timothy Hurst’s 
jury did not recommend life imprisonment.  The jury recommended death, 
and so the sentence did not implicate those features of the Florida statute that 
were in tension with Ring. 
The jury in Hurst found at least one aggravating fact and recommended a 
sentence of death.71  The judge reached the same conclusion.72  If Hurst were 
merely about a right to a jury finding a certain fact, one would expect the Court 
to have held that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in the case because 
the jury made the relevant factual finding with respect to Timothy Hurst.  And 
the fact that others might face an unconstitutional sentence—because the 
statute permits a judge to impose a death sentence without a jury finding of an 
aggravating factor—would not have been a basis for Hurst to prevail, as the 
 
sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written 
findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and 
upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings.  If the court does 
not make the findings requiring the death sentence within 30 days after the 
rendition of the judgment and sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life 





70. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 602 (2002). 
71. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622. 
72. After the jury convicted Hurst, the trial judge held a separate sentencing proceeding for the 
jury to sentence Hurst.  During that sentencing proceeding, the jury was asked to provide a 
sentencing recommendation to the judge, and the jury was instructed that it could return a 
recommendation of death only if it found at least one aggravating sentencing factor 
beyond a reasonable doubt and if it also found that the aggravating sentencing factors were 
not outweighed by mitigating factors.  Hurst’s jury recommended death by a vote of seven 
to five. 
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Court will generally not hear constitutional challenges in cases that do not 
themselves raise a constitutional problem.73 
In arguing to affirm Hurst’s death sentence, Florida emphasized that the 
jury had recommended the death sentence, and that the recommendation 
necessarily reflected a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, which was necessary 
to impose the higher punishment.74  But the Hurst Court dismissed the jury’s 
finding of an aggravating circumstance as irrelevant.  Rather than directly 
addressing the factual finding by a jury, the Hurst Court instead focused on 
how the statute authorized capital punishment: 
The State fails to appreciate the central and singular role the judge 
plays under Florida law.  As described above and by the Florida 
Supreme Court, the Florida sentencing statute does not make a 
defendant eligible for death until “findings by the court that such 
person shall be punished by death.”  The trial court alone must find 
“the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and 
“[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh 
the aggravating circumstances.”  “[T]he jury’s function under the 
Florida death penalty statute is advisory only.”  The State cannot 
now treat the advisory recommendation by the jury as the 
necessary factual finding that Ring requires.75 
What mattered was not whether a jury had actually made the factual 
finding, but rather that the statute permitted imposition of the death penalty 
only after a judge made the same factual finding and found that mitigating 
evidence did not outweigh aggravating evidence.76  In other words, the Court 
rejected the idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only that certain facts 
be found by a jury; instead, what matters is whether the statute requires a judge 
make any factual findings before the sentence can actually be imposed. 
Importantly, Hurst’s victory was not because the Florida system permitted 
judges to impose the death penalty without a jury finding that an aggravating 
 
73. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (“[T]his Court has 
generally insisted that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to 
themselves.”); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
450 (2008) (stating that the Court will not “‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in 
advance of the necessity of deciding it’” nor “‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” (quoting Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))). 
74. See Brief for Respondent at 15, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505) 
(“Hurst received a death sentence only after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt at 
least one aggravating circumstance.  He thus received all Ring could require.”). 
75. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
76. See id. at 619 (“We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)). 
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factor existed—that is, in those cases where the jury recommended life.  Hurst’s 
jury did not recommend life; it found the presence of at least one aggravating 
factor and recommended a death sentence.  The Hurst Court could not have 
granted Timothy Hurst relief on the basis that the Florida statute violated the 
rights of other criminal defendants.77 
One might argue that, even though Hurst had a jury finding, his sentence 
nonetheless violated the Sixth Amendment because of the breakdown of the 
jury vote in his case.  The jury recommended death by a vote of 7 to 5.78  While 
previous Supreme Court decisions make clear that the Sixth Amendment jury 
right does not require unanimity, there is uncertainty about whether 
determinations in criminal cases made by a simple majority are constitutional.79  
Indeed, Hurst argued that a 7 to 5 jury determination does not satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment.80  The Hurst Court, however, did not address the issue of jury 
breakdown in its opinion.  If Hurst’s rights were violated because only a bare 
majority of jurors found an aggravating factor, one would expect the Court to 
have resolved the case on those relatively straightforward grounds.  But instead, 
the Court left open the question whether a simple majority can satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment.  Thus, the Court’s decision in Hurst rests on a different Sixth 
Amendment problem—whether a state can require judges to make findings 
before permitting the imposition of the death penalty.81 
 
77. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (noting “the general rule that a 
person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on 
the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others”). 
78. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622. 
79. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).  In 
Apodaca, the Court upheld Oregon’s “ten of twelve” juror rule with respect to state 
prosecutions, even though it found that federal cases required unanimity.  In a companion 
case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the Court similarly upheld a 9–3 jury 
outcome.  The Court’s decisions, though, emphasized that constitutional problems could 
arise if states moved toward simple majorities.  Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362 (majority opinion 
emphasizing that nine jurors was enough and a “substantial majority” is to be convinced); 
id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring in both cases) (“[A] system employing a 7–5 standard, 
rather than a 9–3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great difficulty.”). 
80. See Brief for Petitioner at 36–51, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505). 
81. Alternatively, one might argue that Hurst’s rights were violated because the jury did not 
indicate which aggravating factor they found as a basis for their death penalty 
recommendation.  That leaves open the possibility that a majority of jurors were unable to 
agree on the presence of a single aggravator.  But this was almost certainly not the basis of 
the Court’s decision.  The Court does not require juror unanimity on alternative elements, 
see Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), and although that rule has been criticized, see 
Jessica A. Roth, Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 170, 190 n.67 (2011) (collecting 
sources), there is no reason to think that the Court would have overruled its previous case 
on point without mentioning the issue at all. 
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The Supreme Court’s reference to harmless error provides further proof 
that the case expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.  The Hurst 
Court noted that it did not reach the state’s argument that any error was 
harmless because the Court “normally leaves it to state courts to consider 
whether an error is harmless.”82  But a finding of harmless error would not be 
the same as saying that the jury’s finding in Timothy Hurst’s case satisfied the 
Sixth Amendment.  A harmless error finding is a determination that, even 
though the state violated the defendant’s rights, the result would have been the 
same had no violation occurred.83  In other words, in leaving the harmless error 
question for the Florida courts, the Hurst Court explicitly acknowledged that 
Florida violated Timothy Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights even though he had 
a jury finding in his case.84 
In short, it is not possible to read Hurst as a mere application of the rule 
articulated in Ring to Florida’s capital sentencing system.  Such a reading is 
incompatible with the underlying facts of the case and the reasoning of the 
decision.  The next Part advances what we believe to be the best reading of 
Hurst, and it explains what that reading means for the future application of the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. 
II. HURST AND AN EXPANDED SIXTH AMENDMENT  
SENTENCING DOCTRINE 
The Court’s holding in Hurst expands the scope of the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine, rather than simply applying the rule articulated in Ring.  
The best understanding of Hurst’s holding is that a jury must make all factual 
findings required, beyond a reasonable doubt, to increase an available sentence.  
Put differently, if a statute or sentencing scheme constrains the judge’s 
discretion to increase a particular sentence, then a jury—and not a judge—must 
make the factual finding necessary to lift that constraint.  This reading of Hurst 
changes the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine because it eliminates any 
constitutional distinction between findings that “authorize” a sentence and 
findings that are required to impose a sentence. 
As this Part explains, such a reading of Hurst not only better explains the 
Court’s decision in light of the facts and reasoning of the case, but it also creates 
a clear, administrable standard that harmonizes the Court’s formalistic Sixth 
 
82. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016). 
83. See generally 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 855 
(4th ed. 2018) (discussing the harmless error standard). 
84. See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623–24. 
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Amendment sentencing cases with the values that underlie the jury right.  
Tying the jury right at sentencing to constraints on judicial sentencing 
authority limits legislatures’ ability to draft around the Sixth Amendment, and 
it allows courts to avoid ephemeral distinctions between factual questions, legal 
questions, and mixed questions of law and fact.  This reading of Hurst also 
preserves the ability of judges to engage in factfinding incidental to exercises of 
sentencing discretion—a practice that has a long history in this country—
without eroding the Sixth Amendment right of defendants to have a jury make 
those findings that increase their sentencing exposure. 
In addition to rejecting a distinction between factual findings that 
“authorize” a sentence and other required factual findings, Hurst may also have 
expanded the Sixth Amendment doctrine in one additional regard: the right 
not only to findings of historical fact, but also to findings that require 
qualitative determinations. 
A. The Central Meaning of Hurst 
Because Hurst did more than simply apply Ring, we must determine how, 
precisely, Hurst modified the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.  The 
short answer is that Hurst appears to shift the Sixth Amendment inquiry from 
whether there are factual findings required to “authorize” an increased 
sentence to whether there are any factual findings that must be made before a 
judge can impose a higher sentence.  This shift from the factual findings for 
“authorization” to any required factual findings would explain the Court’s 
decision that Florida violated Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights even though he 
had a jury finding.  It would also explain the Court’s acknowledgement of the 
possibility of harmless error.  In short, this reading would ensure that the 
holding of Hurst matches both its facts and reasoning. 
This reading of Hurst prohibits assigning to judges any factual findings 
required for the imposition of an increased sentence.  This would do more than 
restrict advisory jury recommendations.  It would also prohibit statutes that 
require both the judge and the jury to make factual findings in order to increase 
a sentence.85  Such a statute would violate the Sixth Amendment because it 
would still make a judge’s finding of fact necessary to increase the sentence 
from one category of punishment to another. 
Hurst also suggests that the findings necessary for the imposition of a 
higher sentence appear to include more than simply questions of historical fact.  
 
85. See infra Subpart III.A (discussing such statutes). 
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In holding the Florida death penalty scheme unconstitutional, the Hurst Court 
mentioned that the judge not only had to engage in factfinding, but also had to 
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors: “The trial court alone must find ‘the 
facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are 
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances.’”86  Statutes routinely require judges to weigh sentencing factors 
and make other qualitative judgments before increasing sentences, such as 
requiring judges to find that a particular aggravating factor is “extraordinary.”87  
All of these statutes impose requirements beyond a jury’s factfinding before a 
judge can increase a defendant’s sentence.  Thus, Hurst may also extend the 
Sixth Amendment beyond questions of historical fact to qualitative 
determinations at sentencing. 
Our reading of Hurst applies not only to sentencing findings that statutes 
require, but also to those that the Constitution requires.  For example, the 
Eighth Amendment does not permit the automatic imposition of capital 
punishment.  Instead, states must narrow the category of offenders who are 
subject to the death penalty by making individualized sentencing 
determinations, usually by identifying aggravating factors and by requiring the 
consideration of mitigating factors that might outweigh those aggravating 
factors.88  Thus, under our reading, the Sixth Amendment applies both to 
statutorily and constitutionally required facts. 
The Supreme Court has also read the Eighth Amendment to place 
limitations on the ability of states to impose life without parole (LWOP) 
sentences on juveniles.89  States that continue to impose LWOP sentences on 
juveniles must ensure that no juveniles receive LWOP except “the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”90—an admonition that 
some states have interpreted as requiring a finding of “irreparable corruption” 
before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile.91  The Eighth Amendment 
requires such findings in order to ensure proportionality in punishment; Hurst 
 
86. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2015)). 
87. See infra Subpart IV.A. 
88. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s capital statute 
in part because it narrowed the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty); see also 
William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67 (2015) 
(exploring possible consequences of this doctrine). 
89. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
90. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80). 
91. See, e.g., Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 412 
(Ga. 2016); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); People v. Padilla, 209 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (2016). 
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explains that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, rather than a judge, 
make those findings.  In other words, a jury must make factual findings 
required by the Eighth Amendment, not just those required by statute.  
Reading Hurst to expand the Sixth Amendment to all findings that are 
necessary to increase a sentence does more than simply explain how the Court 
disposed of Timothy Hurst’s sentence.  It also makes the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine more sensible.  For one thing, it ensures that the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine is more than simply a drafting rule.  In 
particular, it prevents legislatures from drafting statutes that claim to 
“authorize” higher sentences based on one or more jury findings, but then 
require further factfinding by judges before permitting the imposition of a 
higher sentence.  At present, many sentencing systems distinguish between 
factual findings that make a defendant eligible for an increased sentence and 
other factual findings that a judge must make before imposing such a 
sentence.92  But that distinction does not survive Hurst.  Rather than treat 
Hurst’s jury finding as sufficient because it “authorized” the capital sentence, 
the Court instead insisted that a jury make all factual findings that are required 
for the imposition of the death sentence.93 
While the Hurst Court obviously rejected the difference between facts that 
“authorize” a sentence and other facts that are required to impose a sentence, it 
is less clear whether the Court meant to eliminate the distinction between 
findings of historical fact and other findings.  If it did, then Hurst would avoid 
the difficulty of distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law.  
Prior to Hurst, courts limited the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine to 
factual questions; legal questions were exempt.94  Determining whether a 
finding involves a “question of fact” or a “question of law” can be a complicated 
endeavor, and it has created confusion and conflict in both the criminal and 
civil justice systems.95  The enduring disagreement and disorder has led some to 
 
92. See infra Subpart III.A. 
93. “[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for death until 
‘findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death’. . . .  The State cannot 
now treat the advisory recommendation by the jury as the necessary factual finding that 
Ring requires.”  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (quoting FLA. STAT. 
§ 775.082(1) (2015)). 
94. See, e.g., Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 251 (Nev. 2011); State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 
919 (Minn. 2009); Carlson v. State, 128 P.3d 197, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); see also Sam 
Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital 
Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 558–61 (2010) (collecting cases). 
95. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546–55 (1965) (noting 
that “[t]he distinction between fact and law is vital to a correct appreciation of the 
respective roles of the administrative and the judiciary” and discussing the difficulties in 
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conclude that there is no sensible way to distinguish between questions of law 
and questions of fact.96  Focusing on what findings the statute requires, rather 
than whether a finding involves a question of fact, avoids this legal quagmire. 
B. Sixth Amendment Formalism and Sixth Amendment Values 
The Supreme Court has, at times, based its Sixth Amendment doctrine 
more on history and formalism than on the values underlying the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right.  The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has 
walked a fine—perhaps nearly undetectable—line between reserving formal, 
structured sentencing decisions for the jury, while still preserving a role for 
judicial discretion in the selection of the ultimate sentence.  The result has been 
a confused and confusing Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.97  The doctrine 
has shifted over time, and it has, in many instances, failed to ensure that the jury 
serves as a meaningful check on the imposition of punishment. 
Hurst restores balance to the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine; it 
respects the historical origins of the doctrine without allowing the formalistic 
tendencies of the doctrine to eclipse the very reasons for guaranteeing a jury right 
to defendants.  In particular, it respects the long history of allowing judges to 
determine what ultimate sentence to impose, while at the same time ensuring that 
a jury makes decisions “which the law makes essential to the punishment.”98  It 
does so by making the presence or absence of judicial sentencing discretion the 
central Sixth Amendment inquiry, rather than relying on distinctions between 
 
making such a distinction); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 229, 232 (1985) (noting that “the ‘vexing’ distinction between ‘questions of law’ and 
‘questions of fact’ . . . has long caused perplexity in such diverse areas as contracts, torts, 
and administrative law”); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1876 (1966) (arguing that “[c]larity of thought is not 
advanced by debating whether law application is law-making or fact-finding, as 
commentators have done”). 
96. See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 55 (1927) (stating that questions of law and fact “are not two mutually exclusive 
kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter” and that distinction between 
the two is created only by the “knife of policy” which “effects an artificial cleavage at the 
point where the court chooses to draw the line”); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270–71 
(1930) (observing that the “two terms of legal science . . . ’law’ and ‘fact.’ . . . readily 
accommodate themselves to any meaning we desire to give them”); Ronald J. Allen & 
Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771 
(2003) (“The ubiquitous distinction [between law and fact], despite playing many key 
doctrinal roles, is muddled to the point of being conceptually meaningless.”). 
97. See Bowman, supra note 10 (criticizing the doctrine); McConnell, supra note 46 (same). 
98. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). 
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findings that only “authorize” sentences and findings required to select a 
sentence.  It also possibly precludes relying on distinctions between findings of 
fact and findings of law. 
When the Supreme Court first established the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine, it did so in part based on originalist arguments.  The 
Apprendi Court cited these originalist roots in holding that New Jersey’s 
sentencing factor was unconstitutional.  Particularly, the Court emphasized that 
“[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a 
‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by 
jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our 
Nation’s founding.”99 
But while it is clear that defendants are entitled to a jury determination of 
guilt, the precise role that the jury was meant to play in sentencing is relatively 
uncertain.  Structured sentencing—both as required by the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment cases, as well as created by state and federal legislatures—is a 
creature of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  But the idea that 
sentencing ought to occur as a separate proceeding that included facts and 
considerations other than the defendant’s crime of conviction existed for a long 
time prior to that development. 
Early in American history, many crimes were sanction-specific—that is to 
say, a statute would set forth a fixed punishment for all defendants convicted of a 
certain crime.  In those cases, a judge’s sentencing role was essentially ministerial, 
limited to imposing the punishment required by the offense of conviction, and it 
did not include consideration of any of either aggravating or mitigating factors.100  
 
99. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000). 
100. See id. at 479 (noting that early American “substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-
specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. . . . [and a] judge was meant 
simply to impose that sentence”); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2013) 
(highlighting the “intimate connection between crime and punishment” in early American 
laws and practices). 
  This may explain why the U.S. Constitution frequently mentions trials and expressly 
regulates criminal trial procedures but does not mention sentencing procedures or 
practices.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that an impeached official may still be 
subject to a traditional criminal trial); id. at art. III, § 2 (setting forth procedures for 
criminal trials in all cases but impeachment); id. at amend. VI (providing for accused 
defendants to have various trial rights). 
  It is difficult to locate reliable historical sources that describe how a sentence from 
within those ranges was selected.  There is a surprising amount of disagreement over the 
sentencing process at the founding.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal 
Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 131 n.183 (2006) (noting that the “early history of 
discretionary sentencing—especially the date of its adoption in the United States—is a 
matter of some dispute” and collecting sources).  But it is clear that most states did not 
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But even some early criminal statutes specified a range of potential 
punishments.101 
Whatever the original understanding of the jury’s role at sentencing, it 
was widely accepted by 1900 that judges should possess wide sentencing 
discretion.102  But in the second half of the twentieth century, the wide discretion 
enjoyed by trial judges became controversial.103  Highly discretionary sentencing 
practices were perceived as creating unacceptable disparity in sentencing, and 
many began to advocate for reforms to bring greater consistency and certainty 
to the sentencing enterprise.104 
A number of jurisdictions responded by adopting structured sentencing 
systems.  These systems curtailed judges’ discretion by identifying aggravating 
and mitigating factors that judges were required to investigate.  If such factors 
were present, the schemes required judges to modify defendants’ sentences.105  
Some of these factors were questions of historical fact, such as whether the 
defendant killed multiple victims or killed during the commission of a crime; 
others were quantifiable considerations, such as the amount of loss a defendant 
caused or the number of prior criminal convictions.106 
Some jurisdictions used sentencing reform as an alternative to criminal 
code reform.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, passed as part of the Sentencing 
 
employ sentencing juries at the time.  See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic 
Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 316–19 (2003). 
101. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158 (noting that “some early American statutes provided ranges of 
permissible sentences”). 
102. See Hessick, supra note 100, at 131 (“Discretionary sentencing became the American norm 
no later than the nineteenth century.”). 
103. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (arguing that 
judicial sentencing discretion had led to wide disparities in sentencing outcomes); ERNEST 
VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 
3–72 (1975) (arguing for a move toward “swift and certain” punishments in response to 
the increases in crime rate); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS 3–34, 59–123 (1976) (calling for greater determinacy in sentencing); JAMES 
Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162–82 (1975) (arguing that rewards and penalties 
shape criminal behavior). 
104. For examples of such proposed reforms, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN 
PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING (1976); PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN, AND DENNIS E. CURTIS, 
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
(1977); and VON HIRSCH, supra note 103.  See also NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 28–57 (1974) (stressing the need to reform sentencing practices as a 
prerequisite to making imprisonment a rational and humane means of punishment). 
105. See Frase, supra note 28; Reitz, supra note 28. 
106. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 68–70 (1998) (describing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ excessive 
reliance on quantification). 
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Reform Act of 1987, provide the most obvious example of this approach.107  
Even those jurisdictions that adopted less elaborate sentencing structures 
appear to have done so in part to effectuate changes ordinarily reserved for 
substantive offenses.  For example, states that adopted presumptive sentencing 
regimes imposed aggravated sentences based on the kinds of facts previously 
used to identify different crimes, such as whether the defendant caused any 
physical harm to the victim.108 
The more structured sentencing began to resemble new criminal codes, 
the more it appeared to be an end-run around the jury determinations for 
aggravated offenses.  The Supreme Court made clear that it shared these 
concerns when it announced the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine in 
Apprendi and subsequent cases.109  But even as the Court expanded Sixth 
Amendment protections to capital defendants in Ring and to noncapital 
sentencing guidelines in Blakely, it was careful to affirm the constitutionality of 
judges making factual findings to aid their broad discretion to select a sentence 
within a statutory punishment range.110  Indeed, had the Court not reaffirmed 
this ability, it likely would have undermined the historically-based reasoning of 
its cases.  After all, the country has a long history of judges deciding criminal 
sentences.111 
The Court dealt with this historical issue by resorting to formalism.  The 
Court explained that structured sentencing could not reallocate the jury’s 
determination of elements at trial to the judge during sentencing.  By 
concluding that structured sentencing factors were the “functional equivalent” 
of elements, the Court was able to extend the jury trial right to sentencing 
determinations without questioning the historical power of judges to make 
 
107. See id. at 39 (stating that the “legislative origins” of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “may 
be found in the failed efforts of the 1970s to achieve a recodification of the federal criminal 
law”). 
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (1); D.C. 
CODE § 24-403.01(b-2)(2)(H) (Lexis 2001); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5–5-3.2(a)(1) (2012); 
IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7.1(1) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d) (8). 
109. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492–93 (2000) (striking down a sentencing 
statute increased punishment based on the defendant’s mens rea, which “is perhaps as 
close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense ‘element’”). 
110. See infra note 234 (collecting cases). 
111. See Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 403 (1876) (“According to the old law, all the jury had to do 
was to determine the question of guilt or innocence.  It was the duty of the court, after a 
verdict of guilty, to declare the punishment which the law imposed.  If any discretion was 
permitted as to the punishment, that discretion was exercised by the court alone.”); 
Iontcheva, supra note 100, at 316–18 (documenting that jury sentencing was adopted by 
only eleven states before the beginning of the twentieth century).  See also supra notes 100–
103 and accompanying text. 
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most sentencing decisions.  In other words, by equating structured sentencing 
enhancements with elements of new, aggravated crimes, the Court constructed 
a doctrine that vindicated the values underlying the jury trial right.  Because 
structured sentencing looked different than judges making factual findings 
when exercising broad sentencing discretion, the Court did not have to 
repudiate the historical sentencing authority of judges. 
But the fine line between structured sentencing and judicial sentencing 
discretion that the Court had attempted to walk largely disappeared in 
United States v. Booker.112  Following Blakely, it was clear that the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine had called into question the constitutionality 
of structured sentencing, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.113  
Because the Guidelines required judges to find facts in order to determine the 
applicable guideline range, the federal system clearly violated the rule 
articulated in Ring and Blakely—that a jury must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt facts that increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure.114 
But in striking down the Guidelines under the Sixth Amendment, the 
Booker Court adopted a remedy that not only watered down the doctrine’s rule, 
but also appeared to unmoor the doctrine from the values underlying the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Court held that the Guidelines were constitutional so long as 
they were advisory, not mandatory.115  Judges still had to make factual findings 
required by the Guidelines: A judge had to consider the Guideline range in 
selecting a sentence, and reversal on appeal was more likely if she sentenced 
outside of the Guideline advisory range.116  The idea behind the remedy was 
that the judicial factfinding in this context did not violate the Sixth Amendment 
because judges now had at least some discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.  
And because judges had regained some discretion, the Guideline advisory 
range did not define the maximum punishment—the statute did.117   
 
112. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
113. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines Are Dead! Long Live Sentencing 
Guidelines!, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 25, 2004), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_ 
law_and_policy/2004/06/sentencing_guid.html [https://perma.cc/3XX2-BWF5] (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely seems to mean that the standard operating 
procedures for most sentencing guideline systems—including those of the federal 
sentencing guidelines—are no longer constitutionally sound.”). 
114. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
115. Id. 
116. These requirements were made clear in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48, 350–51 (2007). 
117. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (“[T]he federal sentencing statute, as amended, makes the 
Guidelines effectively advisory.  It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines 
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as 
well.” (internal citations omitted)).  
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After Booker, judges were still finding facts, and those facts were still 
driving sentences.  Because a judge was no longer always required to follow the 
Guidelines’ recommendation and could, in theory, impose any sentence within 
the statutory range, this approach arguably satisfied the formal rule developed 
in Apprendi and Ring.  But it did not vindicate Sixth Amendment jury trial 
values. 
The Booker Court did not attempt to explain how its remedy vindicated 
Sixth Amendment values.  Nor is it clear that it could have done so.  The Sixth 
Amendment jury right functions as a structural limitation on government 
officials, and it also confers an individual right onto defendants.118  The 
Supreme Court has often highlighted the jury right as a structural limitation in 
its Sixth Amendment sentencing cases.  As the Court in Blakely stated, the jury 
right is “a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.  
Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and 
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
judiciary.”119  Put differently, the jury right ensures that the people can check 
decisions by government officials in particular cases; if the jury does not agree 
with the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges in a particular case, they can 
refuse to convict.  As Blakely explained, structured sentencing undermines the 
jury’s structural role as a check on government officials.  Indeed, “[t]he jury 
could not function as circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice if it were 
relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did 
something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of 
the crime the State actually seeks to punish.”120 
On some level, the formalistic rule endorsed in Booker continues to rely 
on democratic involvement as a structural limitation, but it is a check on the 
legislative branch, rather than a check on the judiciary.121  The people, through 
their elected legislators, determine what punishment range ought to 
correspond to a particular crime.  Because the voting public knows that a judge 
is empowered to impose the maximum sentence upon a finding of guilty, then 
legislatures will only enact statutes with maximum authorized punishment that 
is appropriate upon a bare finding of guilt rather than based upon additional 
aggravating factors.   
 
118. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 681–
86 (1996). 
119. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
120. Id. at 306–07. 
121. See King & Klein, supra note 10, at 1487 (describing this structural limitation in the context 
of the Apprendi rule). 
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Even so, this structural limitation is weak.  Imagine, for example, a state 
that punishes burglary by up to ten years’ imprisonment.  This state also advises 
judges that they should only impose a five-year sentence unless the defendant 
possessed a gun during the burglary, and it makes reversal on appeal far more 
likely if the judge does not find that the defendant possessed a gun.  The voting 
public knows that judges have the authority to impose ten years in prison based 
only on a defendant’s commission of a burglary.  But it also knows that judges 
are probably only going to impose a ten-year sentence on a burglar if he also 
possessed a gun.  So, the voting public will likely approve of such legislation if it 
thinks that burglars should receive five-year sentences and that armed burglars 
should receive ten-year sentences.  Nonetheless, some unarmed burglars may 
receive ten-year sentences based on judges’ discretion.  This “advisory” 
sentencing system has effectively recategorized an element of a crime—possession 
of a gun—that ought to be found by a jury to a sentencing factor that will be 
found by a judge. 
One might argue that a defendant in this hypothetical advisory system is 
no worse off than a defendant in a system of broad judicial sentencing 
discretion; in the latter system a judge is unlikely to impose the maximum 
sentence on defendants unless there are some aggravating facts present.  The 
advisory system might even be preferable, one might argue, because it identifies 
ex ante the facts that defendants ought to dispute at sentencing, and it better 
ensures that defendants are treated similarly to one another.  But those 
arguments do not explain why judges ought to be finding those sentencing 
facts, rather than juries.  Nor do those arguments address the fundamental 
Sixth Amendment objection—that advisory sentencing systems are designed 
precisely to avoid having juries decide those facts that the legislature has 
identified as deserving of additional punishment.  Further, it does not account 
for the lowering of the required standard of proof from beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a preponderance of the evidence. 
Nor is it persuasive to say that in the past judges have enjoyed the ability to 
make factual findings in aid of their sentencing decisions as a basis for 
reallocating elements of a crime to sentencing.  Judges enjoyed that discretion—
at least in part, if not entirely—because people believed that it was impossible to 
identify ex ante those facts that ought to increase or decrease sentences.122  
 
122. See, e.g., Debate, Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the 
War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1284–85 
(1999) (debate between Rep. Asa Hutchinson and U.S. District Court Judge Stanley 
Sporkin); Peter A. Mancuso, Resentencing After the “Fall” of Rockefeller: The Failure of the 
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Sentencing was thought to be a complex, circumstance-driven, and defendant-
specific endeavor.  Judges could consider any evidence about the defendant and 
her crime, and appellate courts would not disturb those decisions.123 
But once jurisdictions reduce sentencing determinations to a clear list of 
relevant considerations, then there is no need to give judges broad, unfettered 
sentencing discretion.  Perhaps most importantly, there is no excuse to deprive 
a defendant of a jury to make those findings that define the crime itself.  It is, of 
course, true that having a jury find those facts will be more time consuming and 
expensive.  But time and expense are a natural consequence of all criminal 
process rights.  And if the state were able to dispense with individual rights 
simply based on the time and money necessary to ensure them, then the 
Constitution is all but worthless. 
Hurst pushes back on the encroachment of Sixth Amendment sentencing 
rights that has occurred in recent years.  It restores a balance between the 
historical origins of the Sixth Amendment doctrine and the reasons underlying 
the jury right, and it does so in formalistic terms that are sensible and easily 
administrable.  It categorizes any finding that must be made in order for a judge 
to increase a sentence as a jury question.  If a judge cannot exercise her 
sentencing discretion without first making a finding, then that finding triggers 
the Sixth Amendment.  This reading stays true to the origins of the Sixth 
Amendment doctrine.  It both ensures that the jury finding is not a “mere 
preliminary to a judicial inquisition” and retains the ability of judges to make 
findings in aid of their sentencing discretion.  But it does so without allowing 
the doctrine to turn into little more than a drafting rule. 
The next two Parts explain, in detail, how Hurst changes the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine.  Part III focuses on Hurst’s rejection of any 
constitutional distinction between factual findings that “authorize” a sentence 
and other factual findings that are required to impose a sentence.  Part IV 
addresses the possibility that Hurst expanded the jury right beyond mere 
findings of historical fact to any findings, including qualitative determinations, 
that are required to impose an increased sentence. 
  
 
Drug Law Reform Acts of 2004 and 2005 to Remedy the Injustices of New York’s Rockefeller 
Drug Laws and the Compromise of 2009, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1535, 1541 (2010). 
123. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–52 (1949). 
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III. THE MYTH OF “AUTHORIZING” SENTENCES 
The first consequence of Hurst is that it eliminates the distinction between 
factual findings that “authorize” an increased sentence and other factual 
findings required to impose an increased sentence.  But there are several 
sentencing systems that have relied on that distinction in order to continue 
requiring judges to make factual findings in the wake of Ring and Blakely. 
These systems claim to comply with the Sixth Amendment because they 
“authorize” a judge’s higher sentence upon a jury finding of a single aggravating 
fact, and they require judges to engage in further factfinding only to determine 
what particular sentence to impose.  Such systems arguably comply with Ring 
and Blakely, but they run afoul of Hurst.  As this Part explains, the idea that only 
certain facts authorize the higher sentence, even though the statutory scheme 
requires other factual findings in order for the sentence to be imposed, rests on 
a mistaken understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s role in the selection of a 
defendant’s ultimate sentence.  Although defendants do not have a Sixth 
Amendment right to have a jury select the ultimate sentence that will be 
imposed on them, they do have a right to have a jury decide all of the facts not 
incidental to a judge’s exercise of unfettered sentencing discretion. 
This Part identifies those systems that purport to reserve factual findings 
that “authorize” a higher sentence for juries, but also require judges to engage in 
further factfinding to determine what particular sentence to impose.  This Part 
then explains why there is no principled way to distinguish between findings 
that authorize a sentence and findings required to impose a sentence, especially 
in the wake of Hurst. 
A. Cataloguing Sentencing Systems That Require Judicial Factfinding 
1. Florida 
The Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing system in 
January 2016 when it decided Hurst.  In March 2017, the Florida legislature 
amended its death penalty statute.  It now requires that juries find aggravating 
circumstances, state which specific aggravating factors exist, and weigh any 
mitigating factors against the aggravating factors before making a death 
sentence recommendation to a judge.124  These jury decisions must be 
unanimous.125  If a jury makes a recommendation of life in prison, then the 
 
124. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2017). 
125. See id. 
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judge must impose a sentence of life.126  If a jury makes a recommendation of 
death, then the judge can impose either a sentence of death or a sentence of 
life.127  But the judge must make her own determination of the appropriate 
sentence: She must make her own findings about the existence of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, she must make her own finding of “whether 
there are sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty,” and she 
must weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.128  In other 
words, Florida changed its capital sentencing system so that the sentencing 
judge cannot disregard a jury recommendation of life; but the judge must still 
engage in independent factfinding and weighing before imposing the death 
penalty.  The Florida Supreme Court has decided that so long as the jury’s 
findings and recommendations are unanimous, these changes satisfy the ruling 
in Hurst.129  But, by continuing to require the judge to engage in independent 
factfinding and weighing, Florida has not cured the defect identified in Hurst. 
2. Montana 
Montana employs a capital sentencing scheme that involves both judge 
and jury, but it leaves the ultimate sentencing decision in capital cases up to 
judges.130  After a guilty verdict or plea, the judge conducts a separate 
sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant should receive the 
death penalty.131  As with Florida, there must be a jury finding that the 
“enhancing act, omission, or fact occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.”132  But 
this finding is not enough to impose a death sentence.  The judge must make a 
 
126. See Id. § 921.141(3)(a)(1). 
127. See id. 
128. Id. § 921.141(4) (“In each case in which the court imposes a sentence of death, the court 
shall, considering the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings, enter a written 
order addressing the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (6) found to exist, the 
mitigating circumstances in subsection (7) reasonably established by the evidence, whether 
there are sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty, and whether the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances reasonably established by the 
evidence.”). 
129. See Perry v. State, 201 So.3d 630 (Fla. 2016). 
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2017).  Interestingly, Montana did not repeal its pre–Ring 
statute that requires judges to find aggravating facts, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 
(2017), but the new statute, § 46-1-401, clearly contemplates that the jury find aggravating 
facts in death cases.  To date, Montana has not had any case that has established how these 
provisions should be applied, although one capital case is currently pending.  See 
Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty, Montana v. Barrus, No. CDC-2017-
15 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. July 19, 2018). 
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2017). 
132. Id. § 46-1-401. 
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separate finding that an aggravating fact is present and that the aggravating 
fact(s) outweigh mitigating evidence.133 
A straightforward application of Hurst shows that the Montana statute 
violates the Sixth Amendment.134  By requiring the judge to find the presence of 
the aggravating fact, Montana violates the Sixth Amendment in the same way 
that Florida did in Hurst.  Because Montana has not sentenced an offender to 
death since 1996, its courts have not to date addressed the potential impact of 
Ring or Hurst on its death-sentencing scheme.135 
3. Alabama 
In April 2017, the Alabama legislature changed its capital sentencing 
scheme.136  Under the new statute, the jury is responsible for sentencing in 
capital cases.137  The jury makes all findings with respect to aggravating and 
mitigating sentencing factors, and it makes the final decision with respect to 
whether the defendant receives a LWOP sentence or a death sentence.138  The 
new statute applies to all capital cases sentenced on or after April 11, 2017.139 
But prior to April 11, 2017, Alabama’s capital sentencing scheme was, in 
many ways, like Florida’s pre-Hurst scheme.  The Alabama scheme required 
juries to make a recommendation as to the sentence.140  After the jury’s 
 
133. Id. § 46-18-301. 
134. It is likely that the capital scheme violates the Montana Constitution as well.  See MONT. 
CONST. art. II, §§ 24, 26 (articulating the state constitutional right to trial by jury); State v. 
Dawson, 761 P.2d 352, 360 (Mont. 1988) (applying pre–Ring Sixth Amendment doctrine 
to Montana Capital cases); State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087, 1105–06 (Mont. 1985). 
135. See State v. Johnson, 969 P.2d 925 (Mont. 1998) (sentence imposed in September 1996).  A 
recent death penalty case has raised Hurst issues.  See Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to 
Seek Death Penalty, supra note 130, at 1; see also Montana, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/montana-1#sent [https://perma.cc/9Y4L-YF9D].  In recent 
years, the Montana legislature has considered passing a statute to abolish the death penalty 
completely, which partially explains its failure to update its statute after Ring and Hurst.  
Montana has executed three people since 1976, and currently has only two individuals 
sentenced to death in its prisons.  Id.  The closest the state came to abolition was in 2015, 
when the bill died on a 50–50 house vote.  Montana Examines Death Penalty After Judge 
Blocks Executions, FLATHEAD BEACON (Feb. 6, 2017), http://flatheadbeacon.com/2017/02/06/ 
montana-examines-death-penalty-judge-blocks-executions [https://perma.cc/FQR4-KZ6H]. 
136. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (West 2017); see Kent Faulk, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Bill: 
Judges Can No Longer Override Juries in Death Penalty Cases, AL.COM (Apr. 11, 2017), 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/04/post_317.html [https://perma.cc/ 
U8WD-FVND]. 
137. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (West 2017). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. § 13A-5-45. 
140. Id. § 13A-5-47. 
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recommendation, the judge made an independent determination about the 
existence of aggravating factors and the appropriateness of the death penalty.141  
The judge had the power to increase a life sentence to a death sentence, or 
alternatively, decrease a death sentence to a life sentence.142 
In the aftermath of Hurst, Alabama inmates that received the death 
penalty under Alabama’s previous capital sentencing scheme filed petitions for 
certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of their cases.  The Court initially 
denied certiorari in one of these cases, Johnson v. Alabama, on the day before 
it decided Hurst.143  After the Court decided Hurst, it granted a motion for 
rehearing in Johnson, vacated the lower court’s judgment, and instructed the 
Alabama courts to revisit the case in light of the holding in Hurst.144  In the 
months after the Hurst decision, the Court reversed three other Alabama cases 
pending direct review, vacated the sentences, and remanded them back to the 
Alabama state courts.145 
Despite the Supreme Court’s reversals, the Alabama courts continue to 
uphold their capital sentences in the wake of Hurst.  One Alabama appellate 
court, three months after the Court decided Hurst, affirmed a remanded death 
sentence without considering the impact of Hurst.146 
In Ex Parte Bohannon, the Alabama Supreme Court did consider the 
effect of Hurst on Alabama’s capital sentencing scheme.147  Surprisingly, the 
Bohannon Court decided that Alabama’s pre–April 2017 system—which was 
largely indistinguishable from the Florida system that was invalidated in 
Hurst148—did not violate the Sixth Amendment.  The Bohannon Court reasoned 
that a jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance “makes a defendant 
eligible for the death penalty.”149  The Alabama Supreme Court explained: 
Ring and Hurst require only that the jury find the existence of the 




143. 136 S. Ct. 857 (2016) (mem.). 
144. 136 S. Ct. 1837 (2016) (mem.). 
145. See Wimbley v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (mem.); Kirksey v. Alabama. 136 S. Ct. 
2409 (2016) (mem.); Russell v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 158 (2016) (mem.). 
146. See Lane v. Alabama, No. CR-10-1343, 2016 WL 1728753 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016).  
Two dissents raised the Hurst issue, but the majority opinion failed to address it. 
147. 222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016). 
148. The only differences appear to be that Alabama required jury unanimity for the 
aggravating factor, and that the jury could only recommend a sentence of death if at least 
ten of twelve jurors agreed.  ALA. CODE § 13A-5–47 (2015).  But as discussed above, those 
features did not drive the Hurst decision.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
149. Bohannon, 222 So. 3d at 532. 
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penalty—the plain language in those cases requires nothing more 
and nothing less.  Accordingly, because in Alabama a jury, not the 
judge, determines by a unanimous verdict the critical finding that 
an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt to 
make a defendant death-eligible, Alabama’s capital-sentencing 
scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment.150 
The Alabama court did not grapple with the fact that Timothy Hurst also 
had such a jury finding, but instead characterized Hurst as simply applying the 
rule from Ring.151  The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bohannon.152 
4. Missouri and Indiana 
In Missouri and Indiana, the jury makes the capital sentencing 
determination in every case unless there is a hung jury.153  If the jury cannot 
reach a sentencing decision, the judge then determines whether to sentence the 
offender to death.154  As a result, the capital statute in both states authorizes the 
judge to make the capital sentencing determination in the case of a hung 
sentencing jury, meaning that the state can impose the statutory maximum of 
death without the required jury determination of the presence of aggravating 
factors and the determination that such factor(s) outweigh the mitigating 
evidence offered at sentencing.155  Thus, both provisions violate the rules from 
Ring and Hurst.156 
5. Alaska and Arizona 
Alaska and Arizona both have presumptive sentencing systems.157  They 
require judges to impose presumptive sentences (or sentences within a 
presumptive range), unless aggravating or mitigating factors are present.  
Judges can only sentence above the presumptive sentence if at least one 
 
150. Id. 
151. “Hurst applies Ring and reiterates that a jury, not a judge, must find the existence of an 
aggravating factor to make a defendant death-eligible.”  Id. 
152. Bohannon v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). 
153. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2017); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f) (2017). 
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030; IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f). 
155. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030; IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f). 
156. Interestingly, the Missouri Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on two capital 
cases challenging death sentences imposed by a judge after a hung jury at sentencing.  See 
Joseph Welling, Missouri’s Death Penalty Jury Deadlock Provision Is Unconstitutional, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 2019.  Indiana has never had a judge sentence a capital 
defendant with a hung jury at sentencing.  Id. 
157. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C) (2017). 
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aggravating sentencing factor is either found by a jury or otherwise complies 
with Blakely.158  But whether a single aggravating factor is present is not the only 
statutory requirement for whether judges can increase a defendant’s sentence 
above the presumptive sentence.  Alaska and Arizona also require judges to 
determine whether any other aggravating factors exist, and they require judges 
to weigh all of the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether an 
aggravated sentence is appropriate.159 
For example, Alaska instructs judges not to increase a defendant’s 
sentence above the presumptive range of sentences unless one of the statutory 
aggravating factors is established.160  But it also instructs judges that any 
sentence outside of the presumptive range “shall be based on the totality of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors” set out in the statute.161   
Similarly, Arizona law provides that aggravated sentences “may be 
imposed only if one or more of the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation 
of the crime are found to be true by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt 
or are admitted by the defendant.”162  But it also instructs judges that, “[i]n 
determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the 
amount of aggravating circumstances.”163 
It is significant that Alaska and Arizona both require judges to impose 
sentences based on a totality of aggravating factors, but both states only require 
that a jury find a single factor beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise comply 
with Blakely.  This is because judges may find additional aggravating factors 
without using the heightened reasonable doubt standard, and because they 
must consider those judge-found aggravating factors when deciding which 
 
158. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C).  A factor complies 
with Blakely if it is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or if the defendant admits to 
it. A factor is exempt from Blakely if it rests on the Almanderez-Torres exception to the 
Sixth Amendment.  See infra text accompanying note 163. 
159. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C). 
160. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h) (“If one of the aggravating factors in (c) of this section is 
established as provided in (f) (1) and (2) of this section, the court may increase the term of 
imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment.”). 
161. Id. § 12.55.155(b) (“Sentences under this section that are outside of the presumptive ranges 
set out in AS 12.55.125 shall be based on the totality of the aggravating and mitigating 
factors set out in (c) and (d) of this section.”). 
162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C). 
163. “If the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the trial court may find by a 
preponderance of the evidence additional aggravating circumstances.  In determining 
what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the amount of aggravating 
circumstances and whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is sufficiently 
substantial to justify the lesser term.  If the trier of fact finds aggravating circumstances and 
the court does not find any mitigating circumstances, the court shall impose an aggravated 
sentence.”  Id. § 13-701(F). 
482 66 UCLA L. REV. 448 (2019) 
 
sentence to impose.  As a result, Alaska and Arizona make judge-found facts 
necessary to increase some defendants’ sentences.164 
This feature of the two systems can result in defendants receiving 
aggravated sentences without any jury findings whatsoever, because both 
systems identify a defendant’s prior conviction as an aggravating factor.165 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States exempts prior convictions from the Sixth 
Amendment jury requirement.166  As a consequence, courts can sentence 
defendants with a prior conviction in the same way as they could before Blakely:  
Those defendants do not have a right to a jury finding of any aggravating facts 
that may ultimately result in the imposition of an aggravated sentence; the 
judge finds all of those facts. 
6. New York’s Persistent Offender Statute 
The Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions is similarly at the 
heart of New York’s persistent felony offender law.  That statute allows for 
third-time felons to be sentenced as if they had committed a class A-I felony.167  
But the statute does not apply automatically to all third-time felons.  Judges not 
only must determine whether a defendant has two prior felony convictions, but 
also must determine whether “the history and character of the defendant and 
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended 
incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest.”168  
Only if the court is “of the opinion” that such a lengthy sentence is appropriate 
will it impose the aggravated sentence, and “the reasons for the court’s opinion 
shall be set forth in the record.”169 
To be clear, like Alaska and Arizona, New York appears to allow a 
sentencing increase even if the sentencing court does not find additional facts 
that support a lengthy sentence.170  But appellate courts have often reversed 
 
164. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
165. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (7), (8), (12), (15), (18) (B), (19), (20), (21), (31); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (11). 
166. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
167. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 2017).  This means that the prior convictions make 




170. At the very least, the New York courts have interpreted the statute to permit a sentencing 
increase under those circumstances.  See People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. 2005). 
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sentences where the trial judge has failed to make additional factual findings.171  
Thus, it appears that additional factfinding is, as a practical matter, a 
requirement, even though as a formal matter, judges technically have the 
discretion to impose the higher sentence even when no other aggravating facts 
are present.172 
7. Federal Sentencing 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines assign narrow sentencing ranges 
within the broader statutory sentencing limits based on a defendant’s “real 
offense conduct”—for example, the manner in which different defendants 
commit the same offense in different ways.  The Guidelines Manual provides 
detailed rules indicating how various factual findings adjust the Guideline 
sentencing range.173  Beginning in 1987, federal law required judges to make 
factual findings specified in the Guidelines Manual, and it required them to 
sentence within the narrow range that the adjustments prescribed.174 
The Supreme Court found this system unconstitutional in United States v. 
Booker.175  But rather than requiring a jury to make the factual findings required 
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court made those Guidelines 
advisory rather than mandatory.176  Still, after Booker, trial judges are not free to 
 
171. See Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69, 101 n.18 (2d Cir. 2010) (Winter, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases). 
172. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (“If the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating 
circumstance, the trial court may find by a preponderance of the evidence additional 
aggravating circumstances.  In determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take 
into account the amount of aggravating circumstances and whether the amount of 
mitigating circumstances is sufficiently substantial to justify the lesser term.  If the trier of 
fact finds aggravating circumstances and the court does not find any mitigating 
circumstances, the court shall impose an aggravated sentence.”). 
173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/GLMFull.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56ZH-LRPL]. 
174. Judges were permitted to depart from the Guidelines (for example, sentence outside the 
Guideline range) only in situations expressly identified by the Guidelines, see id. at 457–74 
(identifying appropriate and inappropriate grounds for departure), or where the 
sentencing judge found that “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from 
that described.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2018); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 106, at 
101–03 (noting that this provision severely hampered district court ability to depart 
downward from the Guidelines even after Koon articulated the abuse of discretion 
standard). 
175. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
176. Id. at 245. 
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ignore the Guidelines altogether.  Sentencing judges must begin each 
sentencing by calculating the correct Guideline range, and they must consider 
that range along with various other factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
when imposing a sentence.177  Those factors include not only the sentencing 
range recommended by the Guidelines, but also the nature and circumstances 
of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness 
of the offense, and the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant.178 
In addition to requiring trial judges to calculate the Guideline range and 
consider it in imposing sentences, the Booker Court also ensured a continuing 
role for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines through appellate review of sentencing 
decisions.179  The Court instructed appellate courts to review sentences to 
determine whether they are reasonable with respect to § 3553(a)—that is, the 
list of factors (including the Guideline range) that district courts must consider 
in imposing a sentence. 
Making the Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory, arguably avoids 
the constitutional problem identified in Apprendi and Blakely.  In an advisory 
guideline system, a factual finding is no longer required to sentence above the 
Guideline range.180  A sentencing judge can, at least in theory, sentence 
 
177. Id. at 259–60. 
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides, in relevant part: 
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.  The 
court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
179. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
180. Id. at 259–60. 
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anywhere within the sentencing range without making any additional factual 
findings.  But, in practice, judges continue to sentence most defendants in 
accordance with the Guidelines, and appellate courts routinely reverse judges 
who stray too far from the narrow Guideline ranges.181  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court appears to have endorsed those appellate practices, at least in dicta.182 
Because federal judges must find facts in order to make Guideline 
adjustments, and because judges who stray too far from the Guidelines’ 
advisory range will be reversed on appeal, it is clear that judges are required to 
make factual findings before they may impose an increased sentence. 
B. Authorization, Selection, and Discretion 
When the systems described in this Part have been challenged on Sixth 
Amendment grounds, courts have drawn a distinction between those factual 
findings that “authorize” a higher sentence and factual findings that merely aid 
the judge in selecting a sentence from the available range.  Once a defendant is 
eligible for a higher sentence, these courts reason, a judge can make any 
additional factual findings because defendants are not entitled to a jury 
determination of the ultimate sentence.  But the distinction between factual 
findings that “authorize” the imposition of a higher sentence and other 
required factual findings is more artificial than real.  Nor is recognizing a jury 
right to all required factual findings the equivalent of recognizing the right to a 
jury determination of the ultimate sentence. 
1. The Elusive Distinction Between Findings That “Authorize”  
and Findings That Are “Required” 
The idea that only those factual findings that “authorize” a higher 
sentence may trigger the Sixth Amendment jury right is consistent with 
reasonable readings of Ring and Blakely.  Blakely made clear that the jury trial 
right arises when a judge sentences above “the maximum [sentence] he may 
impose without any additional findings.”183  The Supreme Court appeared to 
confirm that the Blakely question was one of legal authorization to impose a 
 
181. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal- 
sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2017_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ALY-4EXY]. 
182. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 46, at 34–36 (discussing dicta in Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38 (2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)). 
183. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (emphasis omitted). 
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sentence in United States v. Booker.184  Booker held that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines suffered from the same Sixth Amendment problem as the 
Washington state sentencing guidelines at issue in Blakely.185  But the Booker 
Court remedied the Sixth Amendment problem, not by requiring sentencing 
juries, but rather by making the federal guidelines advisory.186 
After Booker, federal judges must still make the factual findings specified 
in the Guidelines, and they must “consider” those findings.  But because the 
guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, judges may—at least in 
theory—impose heightened guidelines sentences without factual findings.  It 
was this idea that judges had the authority to impose a sentence within the full 
statutory range, even if they had to engage in factfinding before actually 
selecting a sentence, that the remedial Booker majority said satisfied the Sixth 
Amendment.187 
But Hurst seriously undercuts that analysis.  Hurst demonstrates that the 
mere presence of a jury finding is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment; 
the Sixth Amendment may also apply if a statute requires judges to make 
additional factual findings and if it authorizes a higher sentence only after a 
judge weighs aggravating factors against mitigating factors.  When systems 
such as Alaska, Arizona, and the federal system require judges to consider the 
existence of other aggravating sentencing factors found by judges, not juries,188 
it is difficult to argue that the jury has found all of the facts “which the law 
makes essential to the punishment.”189 
It is not enough that this additional factfinding and weighing occurs after 
an initial jury finding of a single aggravated factor (or a judicial finding of a 
prior conviction under Almendarez-Torres).  If such a finding were sufficient, 
then the jury’s recommendation of death in Hurst would have cured any 
constitutional violation in that case.190  The Hurst jury could have made that 
recommendation only because it found the presence of at least one aggravating 
factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  But the Hurst Court dismissed as irrelevant 
 
184. Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
185. Id. at 243. 
186. Id. at 245. 
187. Id. 
188. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (2017) (“In determining what sentence to 
impose, the court shall take into account the amount of aggravating circumstances and 
whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is sufficiently substantial to justify the 
lesser term.” (emphasis added)). 
189. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). 
190. See discussion supra Subpart I.B (explaining that the Court did not treat Hurst’s claim as a 
facial challenge or an overbreadth claim). 
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the fact that the jury had made such a finding.  The Florida scheme violated the 
Sixth Amendment, according to the Court, because “[t]he trial court alone 
must find ‘the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and 
‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances.’”191 
It is this feature of the Hurst decision that makes the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bohannon and the new Florida capital sentencing system 
appear unconstitutional.  Both require independent judicial factfinding before 
the judge can impose a sentence of death, and so they appear to reintroduce the 
very feature that rendered the sentence imposed in Hurst unconstitutional.  
Although the sentencing judge in Hurst could have imposed a death sentence 
on Timothy Hurst even if the jury had recommended a life sentence, that 
decision sequence did not happen in the case.  Hurst’s jury recommended the 
death penalty, which means that the jury necessarily found at least one 
aggravating factor.  In other words, Timothy Hurst received the same 
procedural protections afforded under the pre-2017 Alabama system and the 
new Florida legislation,192 yet the Supreme Court held that those procedures 
violated his Sixth Amendment rights.  Although the Florida legislature has 
changed the jury’s “advisory sentence” into a “recommended” sentence, the 
judge continues to play a “central and singular role” under the revised law.193  
Requiring a jury to make an eligibility finding and then requiring further 
findings by the judge to impose the death penalty still requires the judge to 
make factual findings before imposing a higher sentence.  That is precisely what 
Hurst forbids. 
While the new Florida capital sentencing system and the pre–April 2017 
Alabama systems repeat the central defect of the system struck down in Hurst, 
one could attempt to distinguish the Alaska and Arizona sentencing systems.  
As the Hurst Court noted, Florida defendants were not “eligible for death until 
[there were] ‘findings by the court that such person shall be punished by 
 
191. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016). 
192. The new legislation did add two procedural protections that Timothy Hurst did not have: 
The jury must find the existence of each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the jury’s decision must be unanimous.  Compare FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2017) 
(including these protections), with FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2015) (not mentioning these 
protections).  See also Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620 (“The jury recommended death by a vote of 7 
to 5.”).  But the Hurst Court did not mention the burden of proof or juror unanimity when 
explaining why the Florida system violated the Sixth Amendment; it focused instead on the 
allocation of authority between judge and jury. 
193. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (“The State fails to appreciate the central and singular role the judge 
plays under Florida law.”). 
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death.’”194  The Alaska and Arizona sentencing statutes suggest that courts can 
increase sentences based on the presence of a single aggravating factor.195  For 
example, if there were only a single aggravating factor present in a particular 
case, and if a jury found that factor, the judge could impose an aggravated 
sentence in that case.  As a result, state courts have insisted that any subsequent 
judicial factfinding does not trigger the Sixth Amendment because it is not 
necessary to authorize or to permit the imposition of an aggravated sentence.196  
Instead, the factfinding is merely necessary for the judge to select a particular 
sentence within the now-expanded statutory sentencing range.197 
But it is not really clear what the courts mean by the words “authorize” or 
“permit” if judges must determine the sentence itself through additional 
factfinding and weighing.  Both the Alaska and Arizona statutes use mandatory 
 
194. Id. 
195. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(h) (“If one of the aggravating factors in (c) of this section is 
established as provided in (f) (1) and (2) of this section, the court may increase the term of 
imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment.” (emphasis added)).  The 
Arizona statute reads: 
The minimum or maximum term imposed pursuant to § 13-702, 13-703, 13-
704, 13-705, 13-708, 13-710, 13-1406, 13-3212 or 13-3419 may be imposed only 
if one or more of the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation of the crime 
are found to be true by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt or are 
admitted by the defendant, except that an alleged aggravating circumstance 
under subsection D, paragraph 11 of this section shall be found to be true by 
the court, or in mitigation of the crime are found to be true by the court, on 
any evidence or information introduced or submitted to the court or the trier 
of fact before sentencing or any evidence presented at trial, and factual 
findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at 
the time of sentencing. 
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C) (emphasis added). 
196. See Cleveland v. State, 143 P.3d 977, 987 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); State v. Martinez, 115 
P.3d 618, 623–24 (Ariz. 2005). 
197. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained: 
The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, or 
a defendant admit, any fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to 
establish the range within which a judge may sentence the defendant.  If, 
however, additional facts are relevant merely to the exercise of a judge’s 
discretion in determining the specific sentence to impose on a defendant 
within a given statutory sentencing range, the Sixth Amendment permits the 
judge to find those facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  Under A.R.S. 
§ 13-702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant to an 
aggravated sentence.  Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant admits a 
single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge 
to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence 
up to the maximum prescribed in that statute. 
 Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625.  Washington courts have relied on this analysis.  See Cleveland, 
143 P.3d at 987–88 (citing and quoting Martinez). 
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language in instructing judges how to sentence.198  Unless the state courts are 
reading this mandatory language out of their statutes, it is difficult to 
understand how they can interpret these statutes as giving judges discretion to 
sentence anywhere within the aggravated range on the basis of a single Blakely-
compliant or Blakely-exempt factor.199 
Imagine, for example, a defendant who has a prior conviction, and who 
may have other aggravating factors associated with his crime.  A prosecutor 
could insist that a judge conduct a hearing to learn about those other 
aggravating factors.  If the judge refused to conduct such a hearing and imposed 
a presumptive or mitigated sentence on the defendant, then the state could 
appeal.  The appellate court would reverse because the trial judge failed to 
follow the statutorily-imposed sentencing procedure; the statute tells the judge 
that she must conduct the hearing, she must find all of the possible aggravating 
factors, and then she must weigh those aggravating factors against mitigating 
factors.  In other words, the judge cannot enter a sentence unless she first makes 
those additional findings and engages in the weighing process required by the 
statutes. 
This question of authorization also plagues the New York persistent 
offender law.  When faced with a challenge to the law in the wake of Blakely, 
New York’s highest court construed the statute to make defendants “eligible for 
persistent felony offender sentencing based solely on whether they had two 
prior felony convictions.”200  It claimed that the statutory requirement that the 
judge base her decision to increase sentences on “the opinion that the history 
and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his 
criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time 
supervision will best serve the public interest” was merely a “procedural rule[]” 
 
198. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(b) (“Sentences under this section that are outside of the 
presumptive ranges set out in AS 12.55.125 shall be based on the totality of the aggravating 
and mitigating factors . . . .” (emphasis added)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (“In 
determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the amount of 
aggravating circumstances and whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is 
sufficiently substantial to justify the lesser term.” (emphasis added)).  Indeed, prior to the 
decision in Martinez, an intermediate appellate court stated “Arizona law does not 
authorize an aggravated sentence upon the mere finding of one aggravating circumstance 
but, rather, authorizes an aggravated sentence only if all of the aggravating circumstances 
taken together outweigh the mitigating factors found by the court.”  State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 
163, 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Aleman, 109 P.3d 571, 581 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2005) (quoting this language approvingly). 
199. See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624 (stating that, after finding a single aggravator, the judge has 
“discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory sentencing range”). 
200. People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (N.Y. 2005). 
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that was designed to give a defendant “a right to an airing and an explanation” 
and to “facilitate the exercise” of appellate review for abuse of discretion.201 
But as with the Alaska and Arizona sentencing schemes, it is difficult to 
understand precisely how the New York courts have concluded that “under 
New York’s scheme, a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence based 
solely on the existence of two prior felony convictions.”202  While courts say that 
the existence of prior felony convictions alone authorize higher sentences, they 
also state: 
[T]he New York sentencing scheme, after a defendant is deemed 
eligible to be sentenced as a persistent felony offender, requires that 
the sentencing court make a qualitative judgment about, among 
other things, the defendant’s criminal history and the 
circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to 
determine whether an enhanced sentence, under the statutorily 
prescribed sentencing range, is warranted.203 
It is difficult to understand how the statute simultaneously authorizes a higher 
sentence without any further findings, while at the same time requires that 
further findings be made before a judge decides to impose the higher 
sentence.204 
The Florida system in Hurst helps illustrate this latter point.  The Florida 
system empowered judges to impose the death penalty if they found that 
“sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and that “there are insufficient 
 
201. Id. at 197–98, 199 n.7. 
202. People v. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (N.Y. 2009); see also Rivera, 833 N.E.2d at 197 
(reading the statute to say that “the prior felony convictions”—rather than the judge’s 
conclusions about the defendant and his crime—“are the sole determinant of whether a 
defendant is subject to recidivist sentencing as a persistent felony offender”).  As the 
dissenting justices in Rivera made clear, this was a novel construction of the statute that 
was articulated only to save the statute from invalidation on Sixth Amendment grounds.  
See id. at 201, 202 (Kay, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute as construed by the majority was 
not before today the law in New York.”).  The construction does appear to have played a 
determinative role in saving the statute; in upholding the statute against a Sixth 
Amendment challenge, the Second Circuit relied on this characterization of the statute 
from Rivera despite the subsequent New York Court of Appeals decision in Quinones 
making clear that the statute’s requirement is not purely procedural.  See Portalatin v. 
Graham 624 F.3d 69, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
203. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d at 1041. 
204. Perhaps this statement is meant to suggest that these additional findings about the 
defendant and her crime are only intended to aid the judge in deciding whether to impose 
a lower sentence—that is the sentence that the defendant would have been subject to, if not 
for the prior conviction.  This reading would explain why the Quinones Court capitalized 
the word “under,” and it would arguably fit within various U.S. Supreme Court language 
that has emphasized how the Sixth Amendment applies to facts that increase a sentence or 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence, but not to facts that decrease a sentence. 
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mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”205  The 
judge enjoyed significant discretion in deciding whether a fact qualified as an 
aggravating circumstance206 and significant discretion in deciding whether 
mitigating circumstances outweighed those circumstances.  But the statute 
required the judge to make those findings in order to exercise that discretion, 
and thus the Supreme Court held that the system was unconstitutional.  The 
mere existence of some discretion is not sufficient to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment; any limitation on that discretion triggers the Sixth Amendment.207 
Federal sentencing is more complicated, but it also requires judges to 
engage in factfinding before they impose a sentence.  In the federal system, a 
judge can sentence, at least in theory, anywhere within the sentencing range 
without making any additional factual findings.  One could argue that the 
factfinding necessary to calculate the Guideline range is not “essential” for the 
sentence that a defendant receives.  The Supreme Court has, on occasion, 
characterized the judicial factfinding as a procedural sentencing 
requirement.208 
But the Court also ensures that the factfinding process is an important 
substantive component of sentencing through appellate review.  Appellate 
courts must reverse “unreasonable” sentences, and the Supreme Court has 
indicated that the magnitude of difference between the Guideline range and the 
sentence imposed is one feature of that substantive review.209  In particular, it 
has instructed appellate courts to consider whether the sentencing court’s 
explanation for sentencing outside the Guideline range is sufficiently 
compelling to justify the magnitude of difference between the Guideline range 
and the sentence imposed.210 
 
205. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2015). 
206. In particular, the judge would have exercised significant discretion in deciding whether a 
defendant’s crime is “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  Id.  § 921.141(5) (h). 
207. Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (“Whether the judge’s authority to 
impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of 
several specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that 
the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.  The judge acquires that authority 
only upon finding some additional fact.”). 
208. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
209. Id. 
210. See id. at 50 (stating that “it [is] uncontroversial that a major departure should be 
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”).  This rule likely 
encourages district courts that elect to sentence outside of the Guideline range not to stray 
too far from that range because it tells them that appellate review of their reasoning will be 
more searching.  Cf. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 46, at 13, 34 (noting that this language 
from Gall was in conflict with the holding in the case, which instructed appellate courts to 
defer to district court sentencing decisions). 
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To be sure, the Guidelines are not mandatory.  Federal judges have at least 
some discretion to impose sentences that do not fall within the Guideline range.  
The Supreme Court ensures district court discretion by instructing sentencing 
courts that they may not presume that the Guideline range contains the 
appropriate sentence,211 and by allowing district courts to impose sentences 
outside of the Guideline range based only on judicial disagreement with the 
policies underlying the Guidelines.212  But reversals in the circuit courts make 
clear that district courts do not actually possess the authority to sentence 
anywhere within the statutory sentencing range.  Circuit courts reverse 
sentences at the top of the range in the absence of aggravating sentencing 
facts,213 and they reverse sentences at the bottom of the range in the absence of 
mitigating facts.214 
Importantly, the current federal system is different from the other systems 
discussed above.  In the federal system, the judge has the authority to impose a 
sentence anywhere within the sentencing range at the moment of conviction, 
whereas a judge in the other systems must have a jury finding or a prior 
conviction in order for the higher, aggravated portion of the range to be 
available.  But it is not entirely clear why this difference should matter for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  We could, for example, analogize the Alaska and 
Arizona systems to a separate, aggravated offense that broadens the sentencing 
range—that is to say, we could treat the jury finding or prior conviction as if the 
defendant had been convicted of a different crime than defendants without 
such findings or convictions.215  If we use that analogy, then the state defendant 
with a jury finding or a prior conviction looks no different than a federal 
 
211. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350 (2009). 
212. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  Several of the Court’s opinions have 
included dicta suggesting that certain policy disagreements could trigger heightened 
appellate review.  See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2009) (per curiam) 
(disagreeing with the crack-powder cocaine guideline differential); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 
574–75 (same).  Such review could raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns under the 
Court’s pre–Hurst doctrine.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing 
Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 742–44 (2009).  But because the 
Court has never actually endorsed such heightened review, we do not consider it here. 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Castro Juarez, 425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2005).  Importantly, the 
circuits appear to be more willing to reverse below-Guidelines sentences than above-
Guidelines sentences.  See Douglas A. Berman, Tracking Reasonableness Review 
Outcomes . . . Final Update?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (July 31, 2006), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/07/tracking_reason.html [http://perma.cc/MW45-TW2Y]. 
214. See, e.g., United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Carissa Byrne 
Hessick, Child Pornography Sentencing in the Sixth Circuit, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 
400–02 (2016) (raising Sixth Amendment concerns about appellate sentencing reversals). 
215. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 107–109. 
Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst 493 
 
defendant in the current system.  Both defendants are supposedly subject to any 
punishment that falls within the range; but the judge cannot impose any 
sentence without first making factual findings.  It is hard to see how the Sixth 
Amendment ought to apply differently to these two defendants. 
There is, perhaps, another way to distinguish the federal defendant from 
the defendants in Alaska and Arizona—namely, the federal judge’s ability to 
make sentencing decisions based on policy disagreements with the Guidelines.  
Alaska and Arizona require judges to impose sentences based on the presence 
or absence of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.216  In contrast, 
federal judges, in theory, can base decisions on their own policy preferences.217   
Imagine, for example, a federal judge who disagrees with the policy 
decisions underlying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ranges associated with 
drugs.  Those Guidelines instruct the judge to calculate a range based on, inter 
alia, the amount of drugs that the defendant trafficked.218  As a result, the pre-
sentence report that the judge receives will include evidence about the amount 
of drugs involved in the defendant’s crime.  A judge, though, could announce 
that she is not going to consider that information.  She could decide that she 
thinks the Guidelines are too harsh when it comes to drug crimes, and she 
could elect to impose the average sentence received by state drug defendants in 
the state in which she sits (assuming that sentence is within the relevant federal 
range).  Under the Booker remedy, the federal judge has the authority (at least 
in theory) to impose such a sentence.  But judges in Alaska and Arizona do not 
appear to have such authority.  Their factual findings must inform their 
sentencing decisions, whereas the federal judge is free to sentence based on 
policy considerations alone. 
This distinction between the federal system and the Alaska and Arizona 
systems matters for Sixth Amendment purposes.  In particular, it demonstrates 
that federal judges may entirely disregard factual findings—especially if they 
may even decline to make those findings in the first instance—which means 
that the factfinding process is arguably not required.  And it is only required 
factual findings that run afoul of Hurst. 
The problem with this distinction is that, while it may exist in theory, it is 
unclear whether federal judges possess this sort of authority in practice.  Federal 
 
216. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(b) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (2017); 
supra text accompanying note 198. 
217. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 198–202 (2014) (describing the different amounts and types 
of discretion in various sentencing systems). 
218. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
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appellate courts have the authority to review all federal sentences for 
“reasonableness,” and it is unclear whether those appellate courts would say 
that it is reasonable for a district court judge to impose a sentence without 
considering the Guidelines’ advisory range.219  Various post-Booker Supreme 
Court cases appear to require judges to make factual findings and to consider 
the Guidelines when selecting sentences.220  Indeed, some circuit courts appear 
to police district court decisions to sentence outside of the Guidelines rather 
closely.221  To the extent those courts routinely reverse sentencing decisions that 
are based only on policy considerations, it may not be possible to distinguish 
the federal sentencing system from the Alaska and Arizona sentencing systems 
on anything other than theoretical grounds. 
Importantly, a recent Supreme Court case on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines—Beckles v. United States222—may suggest a shift in federal law that 
could save the federal system from a post-Hurst challenge.  Beckles involved the 
question of whether the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vague laws 
applied to the advisory Guidelines.223  The Court held that it did not.224  The 
majority opinion explained that the vagueness doctrine did not apply, in part, 
because although the Guidelines “continue to guide district courts in exercising 
their discretion,” the Guidelines “‘do not constrain th[at] discretion.’”225  The 
Beckles opinion is notable because the idea that the Guidelines do not constrain 
judicial sentencing discretion came not from any of the Court’s majority 
opinions, but rather from one of Justice Thomas’s post-Booker dissents.  If 
Beckles signals a shift in the Court’s post-Booker approach to federal 
sentencing—that is to say, if the Court begins to treat the Guidelines as purely 
voluntary226—then it will be much easier to separate the federal system from the 
 
219. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 
347–48, 350–51 (2007). 
220. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 548–49 (2013) (suggesting that district 
courts commit procedural error if they fail to consult the Guidelines and if they deviate too 
far from the advisory range without a “sufficiently compelling” justification); Gall, 552 U.S. 
at 51 (suggesting that appellate courts should reverse sentencing for “procedural 
unreasonableness” if the sentencing judge failed to perform the Guidelines calculation). 
221. See supra note 214. 
222. 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
223. Id.  The Court has held that vague statutes are unconstitutional because they fail to 
“provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”  United States 
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 
(1999) (noting that vague statutes can lead to arbitrary enforcement). 
224. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894. 
225. Id. (quoting Peugh, 569 U.S. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
226. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 217, at 217–18, 218 n.174 (distinguishing the current 
federal system from a purely voluntary guideline system). 
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state systems that run afoul of Hurst.  Federal judges will enjoy the “broad 
discretion” that the Court has repeatedly said does not trigger the Sixth 
Amendment.227 
2. Preserving a Distinction Between Sentencing “Requirements”  
and the Ultimate Selection of Sentence 
The decision to impose a higher sentence, once such a sentence has been 
authorized, is difficult to separate from the decision about the precise sentence 
to impose.  In light of this, some courts have argued that these nonauthorization 
factual findings do not fall within the Sixth Amendment jury right.228  To do 
otherwise, so the argument goes, would essentially require jury sentencing.229 
But this difficulty in separating the decision of whether to increase a 
sentence from the decision about the ultimate sentence is not insurmountable.  
So long as judges choose to engage in that factfinding of their own accord, 
and so long as the statute does not limit their discretion to impose a sentence 
based on what facts they find, then the judicial factfinding does not trigger the 
Sixth Amendment.230  And focusing on whether statutory requirements limit 
judicial discretion, rather than whether a particular factfinding “authorizes” a 
sentence, provides an administrable standard.  Perhaps, more importantly, it 
avoids the possibility of legislatures drafting around the Sixth Amendment. 
 
227. See infra note 234. 
228. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 533–34 (N.M. 2005); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 
626–27 (Neb. 2003). 
229. Id. 
230. Colorado’s capital sentencing system provides an example of how a jurisdiction separates 
distinguishes qualitative determinations from the ultimate selection of sentence.  As Sam 
Kamin and Justin Marceau explain: 
The Colorado capital sentencing statute has been interpreted to require four 
distinct steps at the penalty phase.  First, the jury must find one of seventeen 
enumerated aggravating factors to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, 
the jury considers evidence proffered by the defendant to determine “whether 
any mitigating factor exists.”  Third, the prosecution is permitted to rebut the 
presented mitigating evidence and the jury is to assess whether the mitigating 
evidence outweighs the aggravating factors found by the jury.  Only if the jury 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigation does not outweigh the 
aggravating factor(s) previously found does the case proceed to the fourth 
stage at which the jury is presented with additional evidence and ultimately 
makes a decision as to whether death is the appropriate punishment. 
 Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1017 
(2015) (footnotes omitted) (quoting People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990) 
(en banc)).  Although Colorado has a jury perform each of these steps, the fourth step 
could be given to a judge without running afoul of Hurst, because this step does not require 
any factfinding.  See discussion supra Part II. 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury determination of the ultimate sentence.231  Although the cases 
that state this rule are of a relatively recent vintage,232 we would be surprised if 
the Court were to suddenly discover an absolute right to jury sentencing—that 
is, a right to have a jury decide the ultimate sentence to impose on a defendant 
in every case. 
There is a long history of judicial sentencing in this country.233  In all of the 
cases that expanded the right to jury findings at sentencing, the Court has been 
quite adamant that judges may find sentencing facts if those facts will allow 
them to exercise their sentencing discretion.234  The repeated acknowledgement 
 
231. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995) (“Our cases have made abundantly clear 
that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury determination as to the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed.”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) 
(“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns 
on specific findings of fact.”); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986) (“The decision 
whether a particular punishment . . . is appropriate in any given case is not one that we 
have ever required to be made by a jury.”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) 
(“[D]espite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same 
fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding—a determination of the 
appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual.  The Sixth Amendment never has 
been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue.” (citations 
omitted)). 
232. Although the Apprendi line of cases has overruled several cases in which the Supreme 
Court held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the ultimate 
sentence, it still seems unlikely that the Court would find that defendants have such a right.  
McMillan and Spaziano have been explicitly overruled.  See Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. 99, 105–07, 116 (noting that much of the holding from McMillan had been overruled 
by Apprendi, a narrow aspect of the holding had been upheld by Harris v. United States, 
536 U.S. 545 (2002), and overruling Harris); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 623 (2016) 
(overruling Spaziano).  And some judges have questioned whether Bullock survived 
Apprendi.  See infra text accompanying note 245. 
233. See, e.g., State v. Reeder, 60 S.E. 434, 435 (S.C. 1908) (“The American cases lay down the 
principle that, where it devolves upon the court to determine the punishment either upon 
the finding or upon the plea of guilty, it is the correct practice for it to hear evidence in 
aggravation or mitigation, as the case may be, where there is any discretion as to the 
punishment.”); Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 403 (1876) (“According to the old law, all the 
jury had to do was to determine the question of guilt or innocence.  It was the duty of the 
court, after a verdict of guilty, to declare the punishment which the law imposed.  If any 
discretion was permitted as to the punishment, that discretion was exercised by the court 
alone.”); see also Iontcheva, supra note 100, at 316–23 (noting that only a few states had 
jury sentencing in early America). 
234. See, e.g., Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116 (“[B]road sentencing discretion, informed by judicial 
factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 
220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad 
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. . . .  [W]hen a trial judge 
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant 
has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”); Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (“We should be clear that nothing in this history 
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that judicial factfinding is constitutional if it assists in judicial sentencing 
discretion would make no sense if all judicial sentencing were itself 
unconstitutional.  In other words, in limiting the Sixth Amendment right to 
jury findings in sentencing schemes that restrict judicial sentencing discretion, 
the Supreme Court has, by implication, affirmed the constitutionality of 
judicial sentencing.  And if judicial sentencing is constitutional, then the Sixth 
Amendment does not require jury sentencing. 
But the repeated affirmance of the constitutionality of judicial sentencing 
discretion can also serve to bolster our reading of Hurst and to save it from the 
concern that it is impossible to disentangle postauthorization factfinding from 
selection of the ultimate sentence.  Hurst relies on the very foundation that the 
Court has repeatedly used to invoke or avoid the Sixth Amendment—judicial 
discretion.235  Thus, Hurst recognizes a jury right only for findings required 
before a judge may impose a particular sentence.  It does not recognize a jury 
right for findings that are part of a judge’s unfettered sentencing discretion.  
Hurst requires a jury only for those factual findings required by statute or by 
constitutional doctrine.  If a judge is truly free to increase a sentence without 
any factual findings at all, then the Sixth Amendment does not apply.  In this 
way, Hurst does not upset the rule that the Sixth Amendment does not create a 
right to jury sentencing; it merely continues to impose a jury requirement when 
sentencing discretion is removed from judges. 
C. Judicial Findings That Survive Hurst 
Those familiar with capital sentencing will have noticed two glaring 
exceptions to the preceding discussion about sentencing systems that require 
judicial factfinding: (1) the findings required to impose the death penalty on 
defendants convicted of felony murder and (2) the Ohio capital punishment 
system for defendants who plead guilty.  While both of these sentencing 
regimes require judicial factfinding, they may still be permissible in the wake of 
Hurst.  That is because there are constitutional doctrines at play other than the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine, and those other doctrines complicate 
the constitutional question. 
 
suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into 
consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a 
judgment within the range prescribed by statute.  We have often noted that judges in this 
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory 
limits in the individual case.”). 
235. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 217, at 203–05. 
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1. Hurst and Felony Murder 
The Supreme Court has recognized some Eighth Amendment limits 
on the ability of states to impose capital sentences for felony murder—that 
is, homicides that occur during the course of a felony, rather than intentional 
homicides.236  Enmund v. Florida237 held the imposition of the death penalty for 
felony murder violated the Eighth Amendment because the state failed to prove 
that the defendant had killed or attempted to kill.238  Tison v. Arizona,239 by 
contrast, narrowed the holding of Enmund by finding that felony murder could 
serve as the basis for a death sentence in certain cases and not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.240  Specifically, the Tison court held that individuals who are 
major participants in a crime and who demonstrate reckless indifference could 
receive the death penalty, even if they did not kill or attempt to kill the victim.241 
After deciding Enmund and Tison, but before Apprendi, the Court denied 
a Sixth Amendment challenge to the ability of a judge to make determinations 
required by Enmund and Tison.242  Defendants argued that the Enmund and 
Tison factors were elements, like aggravating factors, and so the Sixth 
Amendment required a jury to find them.243  The Court rejected this challenge, 
holding that these determinations were an additional constitutional limitation 
under the Eighth Amendment, and they did not constitute an element of capital 
felony murder.244 
Even after Apprendi, lower courts have largely held that the Sixth 
Amendment does not require a jury determination of the Enmund and Tison 
felony murder requirements.245  Courts distinguished the facts required in 
 
236. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449–60 (1985) (recounting the history 
and major justifications for the felony murder doctrine). 
237. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
238. Id. at 797. 
239. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
240. Id. at 157–58. 
241. See id. at 158. 
242. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 381 (1986). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 385. 
245. See, e.g., People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Galindo, 774 
N.W.2d 190, 236 (Neb. 2009); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); 
State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 946 (Ariz. 2003); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 26.4(i), at 1018–19 (4th ed. 2015) (“So far, lower courts have rejected 
arguments to equate the factors which as a matter of Eighth Amendment law are required 
for death eligibility with elements.  The rules in Tison and Atkins have instead been treated 
as defenses to, not elements of, capital murder.”).  Notably, some judges have questioned 
whether Cabana v. Bullock survived Apprendi.  See Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 
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Apprendi from the Enmund and Tison facts in several ways.  First, courts 
described the Enmund and Tison facts—whether a defendant’s participation in 
a felony murder made him eligible for the death penalty—as “constitutional 
facts,” as opposed to facts that were an element of the crime.246  The second 
distinction is that Enmund and Tison facts were mitigating—facts that excluded 
one from eligibility for a sentence, as opposed to prerequisites for inclusion in 
the group able to receive a sentence. 
Although we see no relevant distinction between elements and 
“constitutional facts,”247 characterizing Enmund and Tison findings as a 
mitigation issue complicates the Sixth Amendment question.  That is because 
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine applies only to findings that 
increase a defendant’s sentence, not to findings that decrease a sentence.  In this 
respect, the Enmund and Tison findings could bear more of a resemblance to a 
defense than to an element of a crime.  The Supreme Court has sometimes 
applied different Sixth Amendment standards to defenses and elements.248  
Most notably, while the Court has required the prosecution to prove all 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,249 it has permitted states to 
impose the burden of proof on defendants for affirmative defenses.250  There are 
serious reasons to doubt whether that line of cases can be squared with 
Apprendi and its progeny,251 but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article, 
and Hurst does not really speak to that question. 
 
1057 (D. Neb. 2003) (finding that the Sixth Amendment required a jury finding on the 
Enmund/Tison factors), rev’d on other grounds, 408 F.3d 423, 441 (8th Cir. 2005); In re 
Coley, 283 P.3d 1252, 1282 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., concurring) (“Booker further suggests the 
absence of any bright line limiting Apprendi’s applicability to essential facts established by 
a legislative enactment.”).  See generally Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and 
Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553 
(2015) (exploring the intersection between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments). 
246. See, e.g., Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385; State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 945 (2003). 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 88–90. 
248. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
249. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
250. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 
(1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–06 (1977). 
251. Compare PFAFF, supra note 37, at 321 (noting the tension between Mullaney, Patterson, 
and Apprendi), with King & Klein, supra note 10, at 1478 (“[T]he holding in Apprendi 
leaves intact In re Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur, as well as Leland v. Oregon, Patterson v. 
New York, and Martin v. Ohio.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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2. Ohio and Plea Bargaining 
Ohio typically sentences offenders by jury in capital cases.252  But if a 
defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder, then Ohio law assigns the 
sentencing decision to a three-judge panel rather than a jury.253  In State v. 
Belton,254 the Ohio Supreme Court defended this sentencing scheme against a 
Sixth Amendment challenge from a defendant who had pleaded no contest to 
aggravated murder.255  The Belton Court reasoned, in part, that because 
defendants have no right to plead guilty or no contest, the state could condition 
the acceptance of such a plea upon the waiver of sentencing by a jury.256  But the 
Belton Court also defended its statutory scheme on Sixth Amendment grounds.  
It noted that the defendant pleaded no contest, not only to the charge of 
aggravated murder, but also to two “death specifications”—that is, two aggravating 
circumstances.257  It was the presence of these two circumstances that made the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty, and so all the panel of judges needed to 
do was “hear the mitigating evidence presented by the defense and identify any 
factors that militate against a sentence of death.  Then the panel must determine 
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”258 
In concluding that this process did not violate the Sixth Amendment, the 
Belton Court focused on the eligibility question.  It said that, because the “the 
determination of guilt of an aggravating circumstance renders the defendant 
eligible for a capital sentence,” any factfinding that occurred during the 
selection phase did not trigger the Sixth Amendment.  Because the defendant 
was already eligible for the death sentence, additional factual findings did not 
“expose a defendant to greater punishment.”259 
 
252. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 2018). 
253. Id. 
254. 74 N.E.3d 319 (Ohio 2016). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 334–35. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 335. 
259. Id. at 337.  The Belton Court also distinguished weighing from factfinding.  “Weighing is 
not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment . . . .  Instead, the weighing 
process amounts to ‘a complex moral judgment’ about what penalty to impose upon a 
defendant who is already death-penalty eligible.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Runyon, 
707 F.3d 475, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2013)).  Although we believe that weighing, if required to 
impose a sentence, may trigger the Sixth Amendment, see infra Subpart IV.B, this Ohio 
scheme may nonetheless be constitutional because there is no right to a plea bargain, see 
infra text accompanying notes 261–267. 
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Even though the Sixth Amendment “eligibility” analysis in Belton relies on 
the same flawed “authorization” argument that has been used by Arizona, 
Alaska, and other states, Ohio’s system may nonetheless be constitutional.  
That is because the judicial sentencing process is limited to those defendants 
who plead guilty or no contest.  Because courts have not recognized a right to 
enter a guilty plea,260 there are few (if any) limitations on the rights that a 
defendant may waive.261  Prosecutors routinely require defendants to waive a 
large number of rights in plea bargains, including the right to trial by jury.262  So 
long as Ohio can require a defendant to waive her right to a jury trial in toto, 
and so long as courts are unwilling to place restrictions on what rights the 
government may require a defendant to waive in return for a plea bargain,263 
then the Ohio system is constitutional.  That is to say, Ohio defendants have a 
right to insist that a jury make the relevant death penalty determinations.  But if 
they wish to invoke that right, then they must also proceed to trial on the 
question of guilt and death eligibility. 
Recently, a unanimous Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in 
Belton and concluded that its capital system did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.264  Looking at the role of the jury in capital cases, the Court 
explained that the jury, unlike in Ring and Hurst, was required to make the final 
factual finding with respect to the aggravating factor(s) mandated by the 
statute.265  As the Court explained, “Ohio law requires the critical jury findings 
that were not required by the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst.”266 
IV. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS AND THE JURY RIGHT 
It is quite clear that Hurst expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine by eliminating the distinction between facts that “authorize” a 
sentencing increase and other factual findings required to impose a sentence.  
 
260. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“There is, of course, no absolute right to 
have a guilty plea accepted.”). 
261. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (upholding waiver of right to know 
about impeachment evidence). 
262. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice 
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015) 
(reporting that “a significant number of prosecutors seek waivers of all statutory and 
constitutional claims regardless of whether such violations occurred pre-trial, during the 
entry of a guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing, or thereafter”). 
263. See id. at 78–83. 
264. State v. Mason, 108 N.E.3d 56 (Ohio 2018). 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 8.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C)(2). 
502 66 UCLA L. REV. 448 (2019) 
 
But it may also have expanded the doctrine beyond findings of historical facts.  
Although Apprendi and Ring both suggest that a jury is necessary only for 
factual findings, Hurst also seems to characterize the finding of whether 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors as a factual determination that 
triggers the Sixth Amendment.  In holding the Florida death penalty scheme 
unconstitutional, the Hurst Court mentioned that the judge not only had to 
engage in factfinding, but also had to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors: 
“The trial court alone must find ‘the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating 
circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances 
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’”267  In other words, Hurst suggests 
that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors should not have been 
assigned to the judge. 
To be sure, this is not the only plausible reading of Hurst.  The Florida 
statute at issue in Hurst labeled the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
factors a “fact.”268  So, it is possible to read the Court’s opinion as simply 
repeating the statutory language, rather than independently characterizing the 
weighing determination as a factual finding.  Nor did the Court indicate 
whether the statute would have violated the Sixth Amendment if it only 
required the judge to make the weighing determination, as opposed to first 
determining whether aggravating factors were present.  Nonetheless, it is 
possible to read this language in Hurst as eliminating a distinction between 
factual findings that increase a sentence and other types of required findings, 
including those that might be characterized as “findings of law.” 
As a general matter, the line between findings of fact and findings of law is 
far from clear.269  And in the sentencing context, many systems rely on 
aggravating factors that resemble mixed questions of law and fact, rather than 
pure questions of historical fact.  Indeed, Minnesota recently relied on the law-
fact distinction in order to characterize its aggravating sentencing factors as 
legal questions that do not require jury findings.270  Minnesota’s approach 
 
267. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (quoting Act of Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96, sec. 
921.141, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 1352, 1353). 
268. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015), 1996 Fla. Laws at 1353.  The relevant text read: 
[I]f the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its 
findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: 
(a)  That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist . . . and 
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances. 
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015). 
269. See discussion supra Subpart II.A. 
270. See State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009), which is discussed in more detail 
infra text accompanying notes 324–333. 
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demonstrates how distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of 
law at the sentencing stage can be inconsistent with treating aggravating 
sentencing factors as the functional equivalent of elements of a crime.  Criminal 
offenses routinely include elements that appear to be questions of law, rather 
than questions of fact, such as whether a defendant’s actions were “reasonable” 
or whether certain information was “material.”  There is little doubt that juries, 
rather than judges, must answer those questions to prevent states from 
circumventing the jury requirement.271 
If we read Hurst to extend the Sixth Amendment jury right beyond 
questions of historical fact to include any findings that are required by law, that 
calls into question the constitutionality of a number of sentencing systems.  
That is because many systems require judges to weigh aggravating sentencing 
factors against mitigating factors and to make other qualitative judgments 
before increasing sentences.  Indeed, all of the sentencing systems identified in 
Part III that require additional judicial factfinding do so in order to have the 
judge make a qualitative determination.  This Part begins by identifying 
additional jurisdictions that require weighing or other qualitative findings 
before a judge may increase a sentence.  And it explains how those systems may 
run afoul of Hurst. 
A. Cataloging Sentencing Systems That Require Weighing and Other 
Qualitative Findings 
Several state sentencing schemes require judges to make a qualitative 
finding before imposing an increased sentence.  Some states require judges to 
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and conclude that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances before 
increasing a sentence.  Other states require judges to make a less clearly defined 
qualitative determination, such as whether the aggravating circumstances are 
“extraordinary,” before imposing an increased sentence.  In addition, the 
Eighth Amendment may require a qualitative finding prior to the imposition of 
juvenile life without parole sentences after the recent decisions in Miller v. 
Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana. 
 
271. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (requiring jury to assess materiality 
of false statements). 
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1. Minnesota 
In non–death penalty cases, Minnesota judges must impose a sentence 
within the state sentencing guidelines’ presumptive range.  Judges may depart 
from the guidelines and impose a sentence above or below the presumptive 
guideline range only if “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling 
circumstances to support a sentence outside” of the presumptive range.272  
When a judge sentences outside of the presumptive range, she must “disclose in 
writing or on the record the particular substantial and compelling 
circumstances that make the departure more appropriate than the presumptive 
sentence.”273  A judge may impose a sentence outside of the presumptive range 
“only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present.”274  The state 
guidelines include a nonexclusive list of aggravating and mitigating “departure 
factors.”275  As the guidelines’ commentary explains, “the aggravating or 
mitigating factors and the written reasons supporting the departure must be 
substantial and compelling to overcome the presumption in favor of the 
Guideline’s sentence.”276 
After the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington,277 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that its sentencing system violated the Sixth 
Amendment.278  Minnesota cured the defect by providing for sentencing juries 
to find aggravating factors.279  And the relevant state statute contemplates that 
the jury findings be made in one of two possible ways: (1) Either the “existence 
of each aggravating factor shall be determined by use of a special verdict form” 
submitted to the jury at the time that they decide on guilt or innocence, or (2) 
the court “shall bifurcate the proceedings, or impanel a resentencing jury, to 
allow for the production of evidence, argument, and deliberations on the 
existence of factors in support of an aggravated departure after the return of a 
guilty verdict.”280  In other words, Minnesota appeared to have addressed the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine by providing for a jury to make all of the 
factual findings necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence. 
 
272. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.1 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N 2017). 
273. Id. § 2.D.1(c). 
274. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 140 (Minn. 2005) (quoting State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 
426, 427 (Minn. 1989)). 
275. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N 2017); see 
also id. § 2.D.1(d) (describing this list of factors as “advisory”). 
276. Id. § 2.D.1 cmt. 2.D.103. 
277. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
278. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 141–42 (Minn. 2005), as amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 6, 2005). 
279. MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2016); State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 29 (Minn. 2006). 
280. MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5) (2016). 
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But a 2009 Minnesota Supreme Court opinion, State v. Rourke,281 
complicated the Sixth Amendment question.  The defendant had been given an 
aggravated sentence based on a finding that he had treated the victim with 
“particular cruelty” when he committed assault.282  “Particular cruelty” is an 
aggravating factor that is enumerated in both the state sentencing guidelines 
and state statute.283  In resolving a dispute over whether this factor was 
unconstitutionally vague, the Rourke Court held that “particular cruelty” was a 
reason that supported the trial court’s decision to impose a sentence above the 
presumptive range, rather than an additional fact to be found by a jury.284  The 
Court identified as an example of such facts whether the defendant handcuffed 
the victim and sprayed her with chemicals.285  Such “additional facts, which 
were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of 
the offense,” the Rourke Court explained, must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.286  But once those facts are found, the judge alone must make 
the decision whether those additional facts constitute “particular cruelty,” 
which would warrant an aggravated sentence.287 
2. Ohio 
In Ohio, the death penalty statute allows the defendant to choose a jury or 
a three-judge panel to try and sentence the case.288  If a defendant chooses a jury, 
the jury must find the defendant guilty of aggravated murder, with one or more 
capital specifications, to be eligible for death.289  If the jury makes such a finding 
at trial, the court will then hold a sentencing hearing in which the jury will 
consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence, weigh that evidence, and 
recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment.290  If the jury recommends 
death, then the court must then weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances itself in deciding whether to accept or reject the jury’s 
recommendation.291  This weighing determination, as explained above, could 
 
281. 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009). 
282. Id. at 916–17. 
283. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3(b)(2) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5)(a)(2) (2016). 
284. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920–22. 
285. Id. at 922. 
286. Id. at 921. 
287. Id.; MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3(b)(2) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5)(a)(2) 
(2016). 
288. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (West 2018). 
289. See id. § 2929.03. 
290. See id. 
291. See id. 
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violate the Sixth Amendment because it conditions the receipt of a death 
sentence on a final qualitative determination made by a judge, not a jury. 
In Ohio v. Mason,292 a 2018 case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 
qualitative determination by a judge was not a factual finding for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment.293  The Court further opined that even if it were a factual 
finding, it was a different kind of finding than the one prohibited by the 
Supreme Court in Hurst.294  The weighing by the trial judge did not determine 
the question of death, according to the court; the jury’s recommendation did.295  
The Court also suggested that the Hurst issue did not exist because the Court 
had no authority to increase the recommended sentence.296  The Court ignored, 
however, the requirement that the judge affirm the death sentence in order for 
it to be imposed.  Without the judicial qualitative weighing determination, the 
defendant could not receive the punishment of death.  Thus, the availability of 
the death sentence is conditioned upon a judge’s finding.  As in Hurst, the jury 
determination in Ohio is necessary, but not sufficient, for a defendant to receive 
a death sentence.  The only difference between the regime in Hurst and in Ohio 
is that the judge in Ohio does not find aggravating facts, but instead weighs 
those facts.  As such, we question the correctness of the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mason in light of Hurst. 
3. Nebraska 
The Nebraska death statute consists of multiple phases.  There is a 
separate hearing between the guilt and sentencing phases to determine whether 
one or more aggravating circumstances are present.297  The jury must find each 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury’s finding 
must be unanimous.298  If the jury finds no aggravating factors, the defendant 
receives a life sentence.299  If a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, 
then the case proceeds to a sentencing hearing.300  At the sentencing hearing, 
three judges “receive evidence of mitigation and sentence excessiveness or 
disproportionality.”301  It appears that the judges may consider aggravating 
 
292. 108 N.E.3d 56 (Ohio 2018). 
293. Id. at 65–66. 
294. Id. at 66. 
295. Id.  
296. Id.  
297. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520(1) (2016). 
298. Id. § 29-2520(4)(f). 
299. Id. § 29-2520(4)(h). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. § 29-2520(4)(h); Id. § 29-2521(1), (3). 
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facts that are not found by the jury at the eligibility hearing;302 and it is 
quite clear that the judges must base their sentencing determination on a 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as a judgment about 
whether a sentence of death would be “excessive or 
disproportionate . . . considering both the crime and the defendant.”303 
The Nebraska scheme appears to be unconstitutional after Hurst.  The 
scheme relies on a jury finding of “eligibility” for the death penalty based on 
factual findings about whether aggravating circumstances exist.  But a jury’s 
finding of the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances is not the 
only finding that the statute requires to impose the death penalty.  The statute 
also requires the judges to make two qualitative findings: (1) “Whether 
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight 
given to the aggravating circumstances” and (2) “[w]hether the sentence of 
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”304 
Notably, in the wake of Ring, the Nebraska Supreme Court entertained a 
Sixth Amendment challenge on precisely this ground.  In State v. Gales,305 the 
court rejected a defendant’s argument that the statutory scheme “fails to meet 
the Sixth Amendment requirements defined in Apprendi v. New Jersey, because 
 
302. The judges are permitted to consider information in a presentence report that is prepared 
after the finding of death-eligibility, id. § 29-2521(2); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 627 
(Neb. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of judges considering such a presentencing 
investigation and report “only in the selection phase of the capital sentencing”), and the 
judges are permitted to hear any evidence “which the presiding judge deems to have 
probative value” about the question of mitigation and the question whether a death 
sentence would be excessive or disproportionate, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521(3) (2016). 
  While the statutory scheme appears to permit the judges to consider additional 
aggravating circumstances above and beyond those found by the jury, it may also require 
the judges to make their own findings about the existence of aggravating factors.  The 
statute that directs judges how to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence does 
not refer to the jury’s death-eligibility finding as a limitation on the aggravating 
circumstances that the panel should consider.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (“In each case, 
the determination of the panel of judges shall be in writing and refer to the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances weighed in the determination of the panel.”); id. § 29-2522 (1) 
(“[The] sentence determination shall be based upon the following considerations: (1) 
Whether the aggravating circumstances as determined to exist justify imposition of a 
sentence of death . . . .”).  One could read this language to direct judges to make their own 
findings about the existence of aggravating circumstances, or one could read it to permit 
such findings.  If it requires judges to make their own, independent findings about the 
existence of additional aggravating circumstances, then the Nebraska scheme raises the 
same Sixth Amendment problems as the Alaska and Arizona sentencing schemes 
discussed in Part III. 
303. NEB. REV. STAT.  § 29-2522(2), (3) (2016). 
304. Id. 
305. 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003). 
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[it] does not authorize a jury to weigh aggravating circumstances against 
mitigating circumstances or conduct a proportionality review prior to the 
determination of the sentence.”306  The Gales Court noted that Ring did not 
address weighing at sentencing.307  And it went on to defend the Nebraska 
system by distinguishing the determination of “death eligibility” from the 
weighing and proportionality determinations, stating that the former is what 
subjects the defendant to the increased sentence, while the latter “[is] part of the 
‘selection decision’ in capital sentencing, which, under the current and prior 
statutes, occurs only after eligibility has been determined.”308  In other words, 
the Gales Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury 
determination of every required finding. 
Although it rejected this argument in the wake of Ring, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has not addressed the argument in the wake of Hurst.  To date, 
the only post-Hurst challenge to Nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme came in 
State v. Vela.309  Vela, however, did not raise the claim in his petition for 
postconviction relief in the state district court, so the Nebraska Supreme Court 
declined to consider it on appeal.310 
4. North Carolina 
North Carolina has a presumptive noncapital sentencing system.  It 
requires a jury to make all factual findings for sentencing determinations other 
than the fact of a prior conviction311  But the jury’s factual findings, standing 
alone, are not enough to justify a sentence above the presumptive range.  The 
judge must also find that those aggravating factors “are sufficient to outweigh 
any mitigating factors that are present.”312  In other words, North Carolina 
requires the judge to make the qualitative determination about the relative 
weight of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors in order to increase the 
defendants’ sentence above the presumptive range.313 
 
306. Id. at 626 (citation omitted). 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. 900 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 2017). 
310. Id. at 14. 
311. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(b) (2017) (requiring a jury finding of aggravating factors or 
a judicial finding of aggravation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d) (12a) or (18a), 
which identify a judicial finding of probation violation and a prior adjudication of 
delinquency, respectively, as aggravating factors). 
312. Id. § 15A-1340.16(b). 
313. State v. Facyson, 758 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 2014) (“Our Structured Sentencing Act 
provides that if the jury finds that one or more aggravating factors exist, and if the trial 
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5. Colorado, Kansas, Oregon, and Washington 
Several states require judges to make nonweighing qualitative 
determinations in order to increase noncapital sentences.314  Kansas, for 
example, requires juries to make all factual findings other than the fact of a 
prior conviction.315  But the jury’s factual findings, standing alone, are not 
enough to justify a sentence above the presumptive range; the judge must 
also determine whether there are “substantial and compelling reasons to 
impose a departure sentence.”316  In other words, Kansas requires a 
qualitative determination by the judge about whether the facts found by 
the jury are “substantial and compelling reasons” to increase the 
defendants’ sentence above the presumptive range.  Colorado,317 
 
court determines that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then the 
court may impose a sentence in the statutorily-prescribed aggravated range.”). 
314. The New York persistent offender law has this problem.  The New York Court of Appeals 
acknowledges that the persistent offender law “requires that the sentencing court make a 
qualitative judgment about, among other things, the defendant’s criminal history and the 
circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to determine whether an 
enhanced sentence . . . is warranted.”  People v. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033, 1041 (N.Y. 
2009) (emphasis added).  Because New York also requires judges to make factual findings, 
their sentencing systems violate the Sixth Amendment even under a narrower reading of 
Hurst.  In cases in which a New York judge did not find additional facts, see supra text 
accompanying notes 171, 202–204, then this qualitative judgment requirement could still 
raise Sixth Amendment problems. 
315. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(b) (2017). 
316. Id. § 21-6815(a). 
317. Colorado requires judges to impose a sentence within a presumptive range unless an 
aggravating factor is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or unless there are 
aggravating factors that otherwise satisfy Blakely.  Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 716 
(Colo. 2005).  But the factfinding is not the end of the inquiry.  Judges can sentence outside 
of the presumptive range only if they conclude “extraordinary mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances are present.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) (2017). 
  Importantly, the Colorado cases interpreting this statute are unclear.  The leading cases 
have alternatively framed the question whether an aggravating circumstance is 
“extraordinary” as a question of law in the discretion of the trial court, Lopez, 113 P.3d at 
726 n.11 (“We do not hold that a defendant must admit that relevant facts are 
extraordinary aggravating circumstances.  We conclude that this determination is a 
conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on 
Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt facts.”), and as a reservation of sentencing 
discretion—namely, the decision whether to stay within the presumptive range or to 
increase the sentence—that is not subject to appellate review.  See People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 
1030, 1044–45 (Colo. 1998) (“We have never imposed the additional requirement that, 
before a sentencing court may consider psychological or other adverse impacts of a crime 
on victims and their families as an extraordinary aggravating circumstance, there must be 
evidence that the impact is greater than that which is ‘normally’ experienced.  Such a 
requirement would be inconsistent with the legislative intent that sentencing courts be 
granted broad discretion in distinguishing between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ 
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Oregon,318 and Washington319 have similar requirements, as do the Alaska, 
Arizona, and New York systems described above in Part III. 
 
circumstances depending upon the specific facts of each case.” (citation omitted)); see also 
Lopez, 113 P.3d at 725 (“[T]he General Assembly intended to provide trial judges with 
discretion that would maximize defendants’ chances for a fair and individualized 
sentence.”); id. (citing Leske for the proposition that “the General Assembly intended the 
trial judge to maintain discretion to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary 
factors and ‘exercise its independent judgment’ in making that distinction”).  This 
apparent inconsistency has significant Sixth Amendment consequences.  If judges are 
required to make the “extraordinary” determination in order to sentence above the 
presumptive range, then Colorado is not different than Kansas, Oregon, and Washington.  
But if the statute does nothing more than signal that judges are free to continue to sentence 
within the presumptive range even if the jury finds an aggravating factor, then there is no 
“statutory requirement” that could trigger the Sixth Amendment under Hurst. 
318. An Oregon defendant is entitled to have a jury to make all factual findings that would 
increase a sentence above the presumptive range.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.669 (2017) 
(providing that the sentencing guidelines “shall control the sentences for all crimes 
committed,” and that the guidelines “shall be mandatory and constitute presumptive 
sentences”); id. § 136.770 (explaining how to prove aggravating factors that “relat[e] to an 
offense charged in the accusatory instrument”); id. § 136.773 (explaining how to prove 
aggravating factors that “relat[e] to the defendant”); see also State v. Speedis, 256 P.3d 1061, 
1064 (Or. 2011) (describing the “procedures for determining whether, in a particular case, 
an aggravating factor exists that will warrant an enhanced sentence”).  But the statute 
makes clear that, whether an aggravated sentence may be imposed depends on whether the 
sentencing judge “finds there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation 
from the presumptive sentence.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 137.671(1) (2017).  In other words, as 
the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “it is the court, not the jury that makes the 
ultimate decision whether aggravating or mitigating facts justify a sentence beyond or 
below the presumptive range.”  State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713, 719 (Or. 2005) (en banc); see 
also id. at 718 (“Under Blakely, the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have a jury 
determine any aggravating factor that a court may then use to justify a sentence that 
exceeds the presumptive range.  Nothing in Blakely precludes a sentencing court from 
deciding whether jury-determined aggravating factors constitute a substantial and 
compelling reason to impose a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.”). 
319. A Washington defendant is entitled to have a jury make all factual findings that would 
increase a sentence above the presumptive range.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3) (2016) 
(“The facts supporting aggravating circumstances shall be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The jury’s verdict on the aggravating factor must be unanimous, and by 
special interrogatory.  If a jury is waived, proof shall be to the court beyond a reasonable 
doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to the aggravating facts.”).  But the sentencing 
statute makes clear that it is not simply the existence of an aggravating factor that 
authorizes an exceptional sentence, but rather a finding by the sentencing judge “that the 
facts found are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”  Id. 
§ 9.94A.537(6) (“If the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, one or 
more of the facts alleged by the state in support of an aggravated sentence, the court may 
sentence the offender pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535 to a term of confinement up to the 
maximum allowed under RCW 9A.20.021 for the underlying conviction if it finds, 
considering the purposes of this chapter, that the facts found are substantial and 
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”).  The Washington courts have 
made clear that, while the existence of aggravating factors is a question of fact that must be 
decided by a jury, whether those facts “are sufficiently substantial and compelling to 
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B. The Elusive Distinction Between Questions of Law and Fact 
Prior to Hurst, state courts routinely rejected the idea that weighing 
sentencing factors could trigger the Sixth Amendment.320  As one court 
explained, “a weighing of imponderables” is different than “a finding of 
historical fact.”321  Another court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right 
recognized in Apprendi “rests on the notion that the ‘truth of every accusation’ 
should be decided by the jury under a reasonable doubt standard” and that 
“there is no ‘truth’ in the balancing of the proper sentence for the crime and the 
defendant.”322  The prevailing view among these courts was that “‘the weighing 
process is not a factfinding one based on evidence’ but is instead ‘purely a 
judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s) against the aggravator(s) to 
determine . . . the appropriate punishment in the particular case.’”323 
But the distinction between questions of law and fact is not particularly 
clear.  And that lack of clarity has, at times, watered down the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in 
State v. Rourke,324 for example, relied on the law-fact distinction in a manner 
that appears to circumvent the doctrine. 
The result in Rourke is difficult to defend.  It is not consistent with either 
the state statute or the state guidelines, both of which state that a defendant has 
the right to a jury determination on the existence of “aggravating factors.”325  
Neither frames the right in terms of facts that a court could use to support a 
decision to impose an aggravated sentence.  The case is also very difficult to 
 
warrant imposing an exceptional sentence . . . . is a legal judgment which, unlike factual 
determinations, can still be made by the trial court.”  State v. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 202 
(Wash. 2005) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 
212 (2006); see also State v. Suleiman, 143 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2006); State v. Sage, 407 
P.3d 359, 371 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).  What is more, Washington law requires that judges 
must enter written findings when imposing an exceptional sentence; oral rulings are 
insufficient.  See State v. Friedlund, 341 P.3d 280, 282–83 (Wash. 2015). 
320. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 94, at 561, n.118 (discussing cases).  The question about 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment arises not only in the allocation of decisionmaking 
power between judges and juries, but also in the context of whether the weighing of 
sentencing factors and other qualitative determinations are subject to the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.  See Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 251 (Nev. 2011). 
321. Carlson v. State, 128 P.3d 197, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
322. State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 534 (N.M. 2005). 
323. Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 252 (quoting Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) 
(collecting cases). 
324. 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009). 
325. MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5) (2016); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2(D)(1), cmt. 2.D.102 (2017) (citing 
Blakely). 
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reconcile with Blakely v. Washington.326  Blakely involved a presumptive 
sentencing system with a nonexhaustive list of aggravating factors, and the 
defendant’s sentence was increased based on the enumerated factor of 
“deliberate cruelty.”327  Indeed, the state had argued that the statute’s 
nonexhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors were not properly 
understood as facts to be found, but instead were included in the statute as 
“mere proffered ‘consider[ations]’ for the court ‘in the exercise of its discretion 
to impose an exceptional sentence.’”328  But the Blakely Court characterized the 
finding of “deliberate cruelty” as an “aggravating fact,”329 and it is difficult to see 
how Minnesota’s “particular cruelty” factor is any different. 
Perhaps most importantly, in attempting to separate pure questions of 
historical fact, such as whether the defendant handcuffed the victim, from 
mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether the defendant acted with 
“particular cruelty,” the Minnesota approach treats sentencing factors 
differently than elements of a crime.330  When elements present a mixed 
question of law and fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the 
approach adopted by Minnesota in Rourke.  Specifically, in United States v. 
Gaudin,331 the Court held that a defendant was entitled to a jury determination 
about whether a false statement he had made was “material.”  The government 
argued that materiality was a legal question, and thus defendants were not 
entitled to a jury finding.332  The Gaudin Court responded that materiality was a 
mixed question of law and fact, and it noted that courts had never asked juries 
to “come forth with ‘findings of fact’ pertaining to each of the essential 
elements, leaving it to the judge to apply the law to those facts and render the 
ultimate verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty.’”333 
Relatedly, an appellate court in Washington rejected a Sixth Amendment 
challenge to the state’s structured sentencing system by relying on the law-fact 
distinction.334  The defendant in that case argued that the Washington scheme 
ran afoul of Hurst.335  But the court rejected the argument on the grounds that 
the jury made the factual determination about the existence of aggravating 
 
326. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
327. Id. at 299–301. 
328. Brief for the State of Washington at 23–24, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 
(No. 02-1632). 
329. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 
330. See supra note 325. 
331. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
332. Id. 
333. Id. at 512–13. 
334. See State v. Sage, 407 P.3d 359 (Wash. App. 2017). 
335. See id. at 372 n.86. 
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circumstances, while the judge made “the legal, not factual, determination 
whether those aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial and 
compelling to warrant an [aggravated] sentence.”336 
To be sure, the conventional wisdom is that juries make factual findings, 
while judges make legal findings.337  But there has long been confusion about 
the role of the jury in deciding issues that are not purely factual.338  Court 
decisions in this area are far from uniform, and labeling determinations 
“questions of fact” or “questions of law” tends to create more, rather than less, 
confusion.339  It is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between questions of 
law and questions of fact.  Some questions are easy: Did the defendant have a 
gun?  How much cocaine did the conspirators traffic?  These are obviously 
questions of historical fact, and they are questions that the jury must answer.  
But other questions are more difficult: Did the defendant’s conduct create a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury to others?  Did the defendant have a 
reasonable belief that the victim was about to use unlawful force against her?  
These questions require not just determinations of what happened.  They also 
require determinations that resemble legal judgments. 
Even before Hurst, the Sixth Amendment extended to sentencing findings 
that appeared to require not only a finding of historical fact, but also some 
qualitative judgment.  As mentioned above, the sentencing factor at issue in 
Blakely v. Washington was not simply whether the defendant used a gun or 
possessed a certain amount of drugs.  It was instead whether the defendant “had 
 
336. Id. at 371. 
337. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts After Booker: What the 
Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 GA. L. REV. 895, 897 (2005) (“The maxim that 
judges do not decide questions of fact and juries do not decide questions of law is probably 
as old as the common law.  Like most maxims, it is not true—at least not all the time.”). 
338. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 96, at 1771 (“The ubiquitous distinction [between law and 
fact], despite playing many key doctrinal roles, is muddled to the point of being 
conceptually meaningless.”); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making 
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the 
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 994 (1986) (noting 
that “nicely compartmentalized separations of law from fact . . . belie more complex 
distinctions between the categories”); Monaghan, supra note 95, at 232 (noting that “the 
‘vexing’ distinction between ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact.’ . . . has long caused 
perplexity in such diverse areas as contracts, torts, and administrative law”). 
339. See Colleen P. Murphy, Context and the Allocation of Decisionmaking: Reflections on 
United States v. Gaudin, 82 VA. L. REV. 961, 968 (1996) (“[T]he Court muddied the waters 
when it used the terms ‘question of law’ and ‘mixed question of law and fact’ without 
explaining the analytic difference, if any, between them.”); Weiner, supra note 95, at 1876 
(arguing that “[c]larity of thought is not advanced by debating whether” certain 
determinations are “law-making or fact-finding, as commentators have done”).  See 
generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 96. 
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acted with ‘deliberate cruelty,’ a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in 
domestic-violence cases.”340  The sentencing judge held an evidentiary hearing 
and made a series of findings about historical facts to make that 
determination.341  But what constitutes “cruelty” clearly involved a qualitative 
judgment, rather than a question of pure fact. 
Despite some sentencing facts requiring legal (rather than purely factual) 
judgments, if juries need to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors or need to 
decide whether there are “substantial and compelling reasons” to increase a 
defendant’s sentence, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine would 
obviously expand.  Previous Supreme Court opinions suggest that such 
qualitative language bestowed discretion on judges,342 and the exercise of 
judicial discretion itself does not violate the Sixth Amendment.343 
Although it would represent an expansion of the doctrine, and although it 
is not necessarily required by Hurst,344 applying the Sixth Amendment to any 
finding required to increase a sentence, rather than simply findings of historical 
fact, nonetheless makes sense.  For one thing, it simplifies the question of when 
a jury must make a determination.  The dividing line between “questions of 
law” and “questions of fact” is so unclear that many scholars have questioned 
whether we can rely on the categories at all.345  Thus, if the Sixth Amendment 
 
340. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004). 
341. Id. at 300–01.  Those facts included that the defendant “used stealth and surprise, and took 
advantage of the victim’s isolation.  He immediately employed physical violence, 
restrained the victim with tape, and threatened her with injury and death to herself and 
others.  He immediately coerced the victim into providing information by the threatening 
application of a knife.”  Id. at 301. 
342. For example, in Blakely, the judge could have issued a sentence above the presumptive 
sentence not only if he found an aggravating factor, but also if he found “substantial and 
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 
(2004).  The state characterized the “substantial and compelling reasons” determination 
that the judge was required to make as “a question of law.”  Brief for the State of 
Washington at 24, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632).  The Blakely 
Court appeared to share the state’s assumption that telling a judge to determine whether 
certain facts represented a “substantial and compelling” reason to increase a sentence was a 
discretionary decision properly reserved for the judge.  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8 
(“Nor does it matter that the judge must, after finding aggravating facts, make a judgment 
that they present a compelling ground for departure.  He cannot make that judgment 
without finding some facts to support it beyond the bare elements of the offense.  Whether 
the judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the 
verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”).  The Court found a Sixth Amendment 
violation only because the judge had to support that qualitative judgment with factual 
findings.  Id. 
343. See supra note 233 (collecting sources). 
344. See supra text accompanying notes 267–268. 
345. See supra notes 338–339. 
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were uniformly applied in the way we suggest, then there would be more 
consistency among courts, and courts would not have to grapple with the gray 
area of whether an issue is a question of law or a question of fact. 
For another, applying the Sixth Amendment to all findings required to 
increase a sentence is consistent with the formalistic approach that the Supreme 
Court has taken in other Sixth Amendment cases.  In those cases, the Court has 
said that even if a legislature labels something as a “sentencing factor,” the 
Court will treat it as an element if it is necessary to increase a defendant’s 
sentence.346  During the guilt phase of a trial, courts routinely ask juries to make 
findings about elements that are not purely factual.  Asking a jury to determine 
whether a defendant acted negligently or whether a defendant’s belief was 
“reasonable” are questions that are qualitative, rather than factual.  And courts 
routinely reject arguments that elements can be (or are) legal questions that 
judges can decide.347  If we take seriously the admonition to treat these 
sentencing considerations as elements, then juries should make all of the 
findings, including the qualitative determinations. 
Put simply, if we read Hurst to shift the Sixth Amendment inquiry from 
factual findings to any finding that is required to increase a sentence, then the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine would be simpler and more 
conceptually coherent.  And we are not the only ones to have read Hurst in this 
way.  When the Delaware Supreme Court recently struck down its capital 
sentencing system, several justices indicated that they believed Hurst 
prohibited not only sentencing increases based on required judicial factfinding, 
but also based on required judicial weighing.348 
Before Hurst, Delaware required two separate capital sentencing phases.  
In the first phase, a jury determined whether any statutory aggravating 
circumstances existed.349  If the jury found aggravating factors, then the 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.350  At the second stage, the jury 
decided whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
 
346. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 114 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 494 n.19 (2000). 
347. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (holding that a jury must determine 
whether a defendant’s false statement was “material”); United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 
220 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whether the defendant’s conduct affected, or would have affected, interstate commerce); 
see also Kamin & Marceau, supra note 94, at 562–64. 
348. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016). 
349. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209(c)–(d) (2015), declared unconsitutional by Rauf, 145 
A.3d. 
350. See id. 
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circumstances, and that information was conveyed to the judge.351  The judge 
then made her own determination about which aggravating and mitigating 
factors were present and whether the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors.352  The judge also made the final decision whether to impose 
the death penalty.353 
Because the judge had to make her own determination about the presence 
of aggravating factors, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware 
capital scheme was unconstitutional after Hurst.354  All of the justices rejected 
the “authorization” or “eligibility” argument, which is discussed in Part III,355 
but several Justices also expressed concern that the judge was required to 
conduct an independent weighing.356  Those justices interpreted Hurst to 
require a jury to find both aggravating factors and weigh the evidence.357 
Those Delaware justices are the exception, rather than the rule.  State 
courts have repeatedly rejected Sixth Amendment challenges to their sentencing 
schemes.  Those courts have characterized the weighing of sentencing factors 
and other qualitative judgments as related to the ultimate sentence question.  
For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a Sixth Amendment 
challenge to the portion of its capital sentencing scheme that instructed judges 
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and to determine whether a 
sentence of death would be “excessive or disproportionate” before deciding 
whether to impose the death penalty.358  The Court distinguished between these 
findings, which it characterized as “part of the ‘selection decision’ in capital 
sentencing,” and the finding of aggravating factors, which it characterized as 
“the eligibility determination.”359  The Court concluded that while the latter 
determination triggered the right to a jury under Apprendi, the former did not.360 
 
351. See id. 
352. See id. 
353. See id.; Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 320 (Del. 2003). 
354. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016).  See Erik Eckholm, Delaware Supreme Court Rules 
State’s Death Penalty Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/03/us/delaware-supreme-court-rules-states-death-penalty-unconstitutional.html. 
355. Rauf, 145 A.3d. at 433–34. 
356. Id. 
357. In concurring, Chief Justice Strine wrote: 
But, I am reluctant to conclude that the Supreme Court was unaware of the 
implications of requiring ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to 
impose a sentence of death.’  If those words mean what they say, they extend 
the role of a death penalty jury beyond the question of eligibility. 
 Id. at 464 (Strine, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 U.S. 616, 619 (2016)). 
358. State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 622–23 (Neb. 2003). 
359. Id. at 626–27. 
360. Id. 
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As discussed in detail above, there is no right to have a jury select the 
ultimate sentence.361  But weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, as well 
as other qualitative determinations, is distinguishable from the ultimate 
selection of a sentence.  So long as judges choose to engage in that weighing of 
their own accord, and so long as the statute does not limit their discretion to 
impose a sentence by a particular outcome of the weighing, then the judicial 
determination does not trigger the Sixth Amendment.  And focusing on 
whether statutory requirements limit judicial discretion, rather than whether a 
particular requirement is a factual question, provides both consistency with 
previous doctrine and an administrable standard. 
Nor is there any reason to think that a jury is not equipped to engage in 
weighing or to make these qualitative determinations.  Courts routinely 
instruct juries to weigh conflicting evidence introduced at trial when making 
decisions about a defendant’s guilt.362  And several jurisdictions assign these 
determinations to juries in their death penalty systems.363 
Put simply, if Hurst expands the Sixth Amendment beyond factual 
findings to other findings, it still takes seriously the initial constraints of 
Apprendi.  The Sixth Amendment applies when legislatures limit judicial 
discretion by requiring certain findings in order to impose certain sentences.  If 
states do not limit judicial discretion, then no jury is necessary for those 
findings.  In this way, Hurst does not upset the rule that the Sixth Amendment 
does not create a right to jury sentencing; it merely continues to impose a jury 
requirement when legislatures remove sentencing discretion from judges. 
C. A Possible Additional Application: Juvenile Life Without Parole 
Recent Supreme Court cases have placed significant restrictions on the 
imposition of life without parole (LWOP) sentences for juveniles.  Graham v. 
Florida364 prohibited LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide 
crimes, and Miller v. Alabama365 prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for 
 
361. See discussion supra Subpart I.B. 
362. See, e.g., United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing and 
affirming trial court’s instructions to jury about how to weigh inconsistencies in the 
evidence at trial); United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that 
the trial “jury was generally instructed that it was to weigh the evidence and that it could 
‘accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.’”). 
363. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(7)(b) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West 
2018). 
364. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
365. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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juveniles.366  These decisions indicate that juveniles and juvenile LWOP 
sentences are different from other noncapital sentences, and thus the Eighth 
Amendment restricts the imposition of such sentences on juveniles.367  In 
particular, as the Court explained in Miller, even a child who commits a 
heinous crime might still undergo rehabilitation and change in a meaningful 
way.  To this end, the Court emphasized the need to consider a juvenile 
offender’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences.”368 
The Court reaffirmed the general inappropriateness of juvenile LWOP 
sentences in Montgomery v. Louisiana,369 which held that the decision in Miller 
applied retroactively.370  In explaining its retroactive application, the 
Montgomery Court stated that a LWOP sentence is unconstitutionally excessive 
for all but “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.”371 
This language from Miller and Montgomery may create a jury right at 
resentencing under the Sixth Amendment after Hurst.372  When resentencing 
offenders who received mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences prior to Miller, 
several state courts have used the language from Montgomery as a standard for 
assessing whether the new sentence should be LWOP or something less severe.  
 
366. Id. 
367. See William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053 (2013) 
(exploring the implications of expanding the differentness designation under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
368. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78.  Some courts referred to these as “Miller factors” and require 
their consideration.  The Court’s full explanation is as follows: 
To recap: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration 
of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.  It prevents 
taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—
and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional.  It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including 
the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 
pressures may have affected him.  Indeed, it ignores that he might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or 
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own 
attorneys.  And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility 
of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. 
 Id. 
369. 136 U.S. 718 (2016). 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 734 (citations omitted). 
372. Indeed, Missouri found that such a right existed after Miller.  State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 
235 (Mo. 2013). 
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Specifically, some state courts determine whether the offender is “irreparably 
corrupt” and thus deserving of LWOP.373  But not all courts require such a 
finding.  Some only require that a judge have the opportunity to consider 
mitigating evidence before deciding whether to sentence a juvenile to LWOP.374  
And many states have simply banned juvenile LWOP entirely.375 
The state courts that have made a finding of irreparable corruption a 
requirement for a LWOP sentence at these Miller resentencing hearings have 
created a Hurst issue.  If courts are correct that Miller and Montgomery require 
a particular finding—such as “irreparable corruption”—prior to imposing a 
LWOP sentence, then that determination is necessary to impose the increased 
 
373. See, e.g., People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (2016), vacating as moot In re Cowan, 419 
P.3d 535 (2018) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of finding of irreparable 
corruption, mooted after legislature abolished juvenile LWOP); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 
403, 412 (Ga. 2016) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of finding of irreparable 
corruption); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) (same); Landrum v. 
State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016) (same). 
374. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 268–69 (Cal. 2014) (“Miller discussed a range of 
factors relevant to a sentencer’s determination of whether a particular defendant” is 
irreparably corrupt); State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1216 (Conn. 2015) (quoting Miller’s list 
of characteristics); Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016) (finding Eighth 
Amendment requirement of irreparable corruption); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 412 
(Ga. 2016) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of irreparable corruption); State v. 
Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa 2015); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74–76 (Iowa 2013) 
(listing factors and stating that Miller provided “clearer guidance on the considerations to 
be given in sentencing”); State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 256–57 (Minn. 2014) (stating that 
“mitigating circumstances might include, but are not limited to,” the characteristics in 
Miller); State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 237–38 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the 
juvenile defendant’s life sentence was unconstitutional because ”the sentencer [must] 
consider whether this punishment is just and appropriate in light of [his] age, maturity and 
the other factors discussed in Miller”);  Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 962 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2016) (quoting Miller and labeling three of the listed characteristics “important youth-
related considerations”); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (finding that 
the judge could weigh the factors, but that a LWOP sentence for Batts was 
disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment in light of the evidence considered 
at resentencing); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (stating 
that “although Miller did not delineate specifically what factors a sentencing court must 
consider, at a minimum it should consider” a paraphrased version of the listed 
characteristics); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (S.C. 2014) (quoting the factors listed 
in Miller); State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 69–70 (Utah 2015) (finding that the jury finding 
of facts was enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment); Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 47 
(Wyo. 2013) (quoting the factors listed in Miller and stating that those factors are “not 
exhaustive”). 
375. See, e.g., Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 13, 
2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole 
[https://perma.cc/6UY7-2UFQ] (reporting that twenty-one states have abolished juvenile 
LWOP since Miller). 
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sentence.  Pursuant to Hurst, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the jury, not 
the judge, decide whether an offender is irreparably corrupt. 
The question of whether a person is irreparably corrupt requires more 
than simply a finding of historical fact.376  It is an application of law to fact; it 
requires a decisionmaker to find various facts about a defendant and his crime, 
and then to make a judgment, based on those facts, about whether the 
defendant is likely to rehabilitate or whether he is irreparably corrupt.  That 
factfinding, followed by qualitative judgment, is no different than what was 
required in Blakely v. Washington, where the sentencing increase depended on 
a judge finding facts to determine whether the defendant had acted with 
“deliberate cruelty.”377 
Whether the Sixth Amendment extends to the juvenile LWOP question 
may ultimately turn not on whether the “irreparably corrupt” standard is 
framed as a question of law or a question of fact, but rather on whether the 
LWOP question is framed as a question of increasing a defendant’s sentence or 
decreasing it.  If Miller and Montgomery merely require that judges be 
permitted to consider mitigating evidence before deciding whether to impose a 
LWOP sentence on a juvenile, then the Sixth Amendment will not apply.378  As 
the felony murder discussion above explains, the Sixth Amendment applies 
only to findings that increase a sentence, not factors that decrease a sentence.379  
But if Miller and Montgomery actually require judges to make an affirmative 
finding before they may impose a sentence—such as a finding that a defendant 
is “irreparably corrupt”—then that finding is necessary to the harsher sentence, 
and it must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida expanded the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine.  It rejected a constitutional distinction 
between factual findings that “authorize” a sentencing increase and other 
required factual findings.  Hurst may also have expanded the doctrine beyond 
findings of historical fact to any finding, including weighing sentencing factors 
and other qualitative determinations. 
 
376. See discussion supra Subpart IV.B. 
377. See supra text accompanying notes 326–329. 
378. Indeed, a number of courts have taken this approach in rejecting Apprendi challenges to 
juvenile LWOP sentencing.  See People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016); 
People v. Blackwell, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444 (2016); Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2017). 
379. See supra text accompanying notes 249–251. 
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These expansions will have wide-ranging consequences on sentencing in 
the United States.  In the wake of Hurst, several state legislatures have amended 
their capital sentencing schemes,380 and at least one state supreme court struck 
down its capital punishment statute.381  But more change is almost certainly on 
the way.  Several capital and noncapital sentencing systems continue to rely on 
a distinction between factual findings that “authorize” a sentencing increase 
and other required factual findings—a distinction that Hurst rejected.  And 
many other states require judges to weigh sentencing factors or make other 
qualitative findings, which may also be unconstitutional after Hurst. 
Since the Supreme Court first recognized the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine in 2000, it has undergone several expansions and contractions.  Hurst 




380. See supra text accompanying notes 124–129, 136–139 (discussing amendments to the 
Alabama and Florida capital sentencing schemes). 
381. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016). 
